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INTRODUCTION 
All I maintain is that on this earth there are pestilences and 
there are victims, and it’s up to us, so far as possible, not to 
join forces with the pestilences.1 
 
The regime of international law is illegitimate. It is a 
predatory system that legitimizes, reproduces and sustains 
the plunder and subordination of the Third World by the 
West. Neither universality nor its promise of global order 
and stability make international law a just, equitable, and 
legitimate code of global governance for the Third World. 
The construction and universalization of international law 
were essential to the imperial expansion that subordinated 
non-European peoples and societies to European conquest 
and domination.2 
 
Our generation has witnessed the unmasking of 
international law and it is not necessarily a bad thing. This 
unmasking process might well culminate in a “Grotian 
Moment”3 of sorts, but, in the end, international law as we have 
come to know it will not survive.4 The international law of today, 
modern international law, is an inheritance from the age of 
conquests that has gone through periodic regeneration to 
                                                                                                                            
1.  ALBERT CAMUS, THE PLAGUE 253–54 (1st Vintage International ed. 1991). 
2.  Makau Mutua, What Is TWAIL?, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 31 (2000). 
3.  A “Grotian Moment” has been defined as “a period in world history that seems 
analogous at least to the end of European feudalism . . . when new norms, procedures, 
and institutions had to be devised to cope with the then decline of the Church and the 
emergence of the secular state.” BURNS H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
WORLD ORDER 1369 (3d ed. 1997). It has also been defined “as that historical time of 
uncertainty and controversy when one framework of world order is being challenged by 
an alternative framework.” BURNS H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD 
ORDER 1269 (4th ed. 2006) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 4TH 
EDITION]. See also Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L. L. 1, 18–53 (1946); Ibrahim J. Gassama, International Law at a Grotian 
Moment: The Invasion of Iraq in Context, 18 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1 (2004). But for a more 
restrained assessment of Grotius’ influence, see Hedley Bull, The Grotian Conception of 
International Society, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 4TH EDITION, supra, at 
1281, 1281–85.  
4.  See INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 4TH EDITION, supra note 3, at 
1269 (“In our time, the resilient framework of relations among sovereign states that has 
persisted since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years War is being 
challenged by several contending approaches to global governance.”).  
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emerge as it is today: incoherent and incompetent. It has found 
sustenance in a convincing retelling of its lineage and has 
nurtured exaggerated promises among those who have long 
suffered under its savage embrace and who should have 
rationally rejected it. Instead, these victims made pragmatic 
accommodations and adopted their masters’ restatement of 
history. The law that once aided conquest and domination was 
thus transformed into guiding principles of a future world built 
on sovereign equality, self-determination, human rights, peace, 
and economic cooperation. The venerable Hersch Lauterpacht 
proclaimed broadly that, “international law, which has excelled 
in punctilious insistence on the respect owed by one sovereign 
State to another, henceforth acknowledges the sovereignty of 
man. For fundamental human rights are rights superior to the 
law of the sovereign state.”5 Professor Mary Ann Glendon wrote 
passionately of “a world made new,” where “the mightiest 
nations on earth bowed to the demands of smaller countries for 
recognition of a common standard by which the rights and 
wrongs of every nation’s behavior could be measured.”6 
The dispossessed generally signed on to this renewal 
mission, presented as the progressive realization of law. They 
often infused it with their own hopes for transformative global 
change. Indeed, over the course of the decades since the Second 
World War, the re-casted regime of international law did 
nurture noble aspirations and inspire courageous efforts to 
remake the world. Nelson Mandela and many others in the 
decolonization movement testified to this.7 The decolonization 
movement was matched by a spirited international commitment 
to transnational institution building and frenzied standard-
setting initiatives. The Genocide Convention, the United 
Nations and its many agencies and affiliates, international 
finance and development institutions, the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (“UDHR”), and the human rights covenants, 
all mark just the tip of this effort. The overarching goal was to 
remind us of who we thought we were before the nastiness of 
                                                                                                                            
5.  See HENRY STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 
145 (3d ed. 2008).  
6.  MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE 
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS xv (2001).  
7.  See NELSON MANDELA, LONG WALK TO FREEDOM 83–84 (1994). 
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unrestrained war making, slavery, genocide, ethnic cleansing, 
and economic exploitation took us off course. The language of 
international law was applied liberally. Some, of course, may 
have cynically signed on knowing that the game had not really 
changed at all and that the outcome was rigged. 
The post Second World War evangelical recommitment to 
international law sustained the quest for a new secular Holy 
Grail, for a future in which, in Tennyson’s words, “the kindly 
earth shall slumber, lapt in universal law.”8 Yet, the refurbished 
regime has grown unwieldy under the weight of its 
contradictions, and increasingly inconsequential in the face of 
humanity’s greatest concerns and demands.9 Our common 
heritage of general war making with all its attendant savagery is 
as vibrant and attractive as ever. The threat of nuclear 
annihilation, ironically introduced in the infancy of the new 
international regime, has not receded. In fact, it poses a greater 
threat to human survival and happiness today than ever. 
Moreover, the persistence of human misery policed by 
structured violence continues to astound. Our commitment to 
material development built around exploitation of fossil fuel has 
not only given us an even more unequal world, it has also given 
us the new threat of catastrophic climate change. Thus, even as 
devoted legions of believers in the new global regime of 
international law continue to press on with happy talk, our 
hopes are increasingly stressed and our faith unhinged from 
everyday realities of life for much of humanity. How long can 
the faithful continue to assert the reality of the enterprise called 
international law in the face of persistent evidence of its 
doctrinal incoherence and functional incompetence? 
Not long ago, Cuban dictator Fidel Castro was asked by 
members of a delegation of prominent human rights activists 
why racial discrimination remained so stubbornly prevalent in 
the socialist country.10 To the evident consternation of 
                                                                                                                            
8.  ALFRED LORD TENNYSON, LOCKSLEY HALL 54 (1842).  
9.  See INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 4TH EDITION, supra note 3, at 
1265–70.  
10.  See TRANSAFRICA FORUM CUBA DELEGATION, FORTY YEARS OF HOSTILITY IS 
ENOUGH—CONSEQUENCES OF THE UNITED STATES’ ECONOMIC EMBARGO ON CUBA 
(Mar. 1999). See generally Roberto Zurbano, For Blacks in Cuba, the Revolution Hasn’t 
Begun, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/24/opinion/
sunday/for-blacks-in-cuba-the-revolution-hasnt-begun.html. 
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subordinates, he admitted that his authoritarian regime had 
failed to stamp out racism but not for a lack of laws and 
governmental policies. With a degree of resignation, he 
suggested that psychology might provide a more helpful answer 
to the hardiness of racism in Cuba. Perhaps his observation has 
relevance to the situation facing international law today. As 
global crises, from climate change to nuclear confrontation, 
endemic misery to assorted crimes against humanity, escalate, 
international law theorists and activists strive to secure a role for 
the regime of international law, impelled by a devotion 
unjustified by history or necessity. Their fidelity is misplaced. 
International lawyers and activists, looking objectively at the 
critical issues facing humanity today, should come to a 
conclusion that the discipline as currently conceived is not the 
proper vehicle for the change the world needs now. 
The simple fact that this much venerated object of faith has 
not fed a single starving child, freed oppressed peoples 
anywhere, stopped recurring genocide or crimes against 
humanity, nor held back the oceans should engender a more 
reflective perspective. Doctrine is not fate. So much energy is 
being wasted trying to justify and maintain this essentially 
bankrupt system. Is this being done because there is not a 
reasonable alternative? Or is it because its adherents are much 
too invested in the edifice? It would be more worthwhile to 
embrace the radical changes that are needed and engage more 
forthrightly the process of developing a new paradigm for 
human relationships unfettered by tired and discredited 
doctrines, processes, and faiths, all accouterments of fidelity to a 
fictive narrative. 
In a 2004 article on the invasion of Iraq, I asked whether 
international law was on the verge of a “Grotian Moment.”11 I 
wrote: 
This age cries for humility. We don’t need a Grotius to tell 
us that. So much has been tried and the landscape is littered 
with regrets, failures, and catastrophe. But the problem was 
not trying. It was the conviction. The past century offered 
too many solutions and not enough questions.12 
                                                                                                                            
11.  Gassama, supra note 3, at 30.  
12.  Id. at 50. 
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In retrospect, that was a restrained assessment of the role of 
international law as it saw a continuing role for the discipline, 
properly refurbished. That article urged that we keep trying, an 
expression of optimism that is common even among the severest 
critics of international law. Such optimism is an integral part of 
the heritage of progressive development of international law 
catechism.13 
This Article argues that modern international law in the 
areas where it should matter most is dying under the weight of 
doctrinal incoherence and general functional incompetence. In 
other words, international law is not meeting its prime 
justifications in critical areas. It is not doing what it was 
supposedly refurbished to do after the Second World War and it 
exists today largely in a state of disarray doctrinally and 
functionally when it comes to dealing with critical problems 
afflicting humanity. Further, this Article insists that international 
law has not relinquished its foundational role in helping to 
rationalize a global order that is characterized by a predatory 
international economic system, systematic violence that 
ultimately serves powerful states and interests, broad tolerance 
of structured misery, as well as a general incapacity to get 
nations to act in concert in the interest of humanity as a whole. 
On the other hand, international law has succeeded 
magnificently as the source of faith or numbing happy talk for 
those who believe that we have, or could, develop the will and 
expertise to do better, identify and civilize savages, and fix the 
world. 
To support my argument, I examine international law’s 
contributions to how we deal with problems in three critical 
areas of human life: avoidance of catastrophe, containment of 
destructive conflicts, and promotion of decency in terms of the 
reduction of global misery or structured poverty.14 Within these 
                                                                                                                            
13.  See U.N. Charter art. 13, para. 1(a). 
14.  This categorization is borrowed from Richard Falk, who suggested that 
international law’s capacities and limits should be tested across four broad areas: (1) 
the management of complexity; (2) the containment of conflict within tolerable limits; 
(3) the promotion of decency in the world; and (4) the avoidance of catastrophe. Like 
the 2004 article, this one is also influenced by Professor Falk’s work. See Richard A. 
Falk, The World Order Between Inter-State Law and the Law of Humanity: The Role of Civil 
Society Institutions, in COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY: AN AGENDA FOR A NEW ORDER 163 
(Daniele Archibugi & David Held eds., 1995) [hereinafter Falk, World Order]; see also 
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categories, I look specifically at the challenges posed by climate 
change, the threat of nuclear annihilation, the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq, the on-going civil war in Syria, and the persistence of 
misery policed by violence in much of the world as well as the 
Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”) initiative designed to 
address it. These case studies support the argument that an 
unjustifiable importance is placed on international law as we 
now conceive of it instead of accepting and confronting the 
reality of international politics. 
This Article builds on the Third World Approaches to 
International Law (“TWAIL”)15 critique of international law 
going back to luminaries like Mohammed Bedjaoui, R.P. Anand, 
and Georges Abi-Saab.16 It also benefits from other critical 
perspectives on the limits of international law, including Marti 
Koskenniemi’s From Apology to Utopia: the Structure of International 
Legal Argument,17 and David Kennedy’s The Dark Sides of Virtue.18 
These critical perspectives should be distinguished from those of 
positivists who actually question whether international law is 
really law at all,19 or critics who argue that international law is 
merely law that “emerges from states acting rationally to 
                                                                                                                            
RICHARD A. FALK, REVITALIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW (1989) [hereinafter FALK, 
REVITALIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW]. 
15.  See Mutua, supra note 2, at 31; see also Antony Anghie & B.S. Chimni, Methods 
of International Law: Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual 
Responsibility in Internal Conflicts, 36 STUD. IN TRANSNAT’L LEGAL POL’Y 185 (2004). See 
generally SIBA N. GROVOGUI, SOVEREIGNS, QUASI-SOVEREIGNS, AND AFRICANS: RACE AND 
SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 16–20 (1996); Antony Anghie, Francisco 
De Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law, 5 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 321 (1996) 
[hereinafter Anghie, Colonial Origins]. 
16.  See, e.g., Mohammed Bedjaoui, No Development Without Peace, No Peace Without 
Development, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND A JUST WORLD ORDER 178–83 (Richard Falk 
et al. eds., 1991); R.P. ANAND, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
CONFRONTATION OR COOPERATION? (1987); Georges Abi-Saab, The Changing World 
Order and the International Legal Order: The Structural Evolution of International Law Beyond 
the State-Centric Model, in GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION: CHALLENGES TO THE STATE SYSTEM 
439–61 (Y. Sakamoto ed., 1994).  
17.  MARTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (1989). 
18.  DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIANISM (2004). 
19.  See, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 133, 
201–17 (Weidenfeld & Nicholson eds., 1954); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 209 
(1961). For a summary of these perspectives, see INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD 
ORDER 4TH EDITION, supra note 3, at 20–67. 
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maximize their interests, given their perceptions of the interests 
of other states and the distribution of state power.”20 Both 
positivists and the latter rational choice theorists adopt narrow 
and shortsighted understanding of both the nature of law and 
how people and countries define their interests. The perspective 
offered here does not reject a place for law in global affairs. On 
the contrary, it presumes a need for it in the classic sense of law 
as sanctioned regularity, or legitimized politics of the common, 
helpful, indeed essential, in varying degrees to some areas of 
international life.21 Furthermore, while the criticism of the 
dominant conception of law presented here does not develop a 
different vision of law for the global community, such as a “law 
of humanity,”22 it does not reject the possibilities for such. 
I. A RESTRAINED CONCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The conception of international law that is challenged in 
this Article and criticized as incoherent and functionally 
incompetent is found in treaties as well as in custom.23 It is 
modern international law in the various forms in which it has 
been articulated and promoted since at least the end of the 
Second World War: the international law of peace, 
humanitarianism, human rights, sovereign equality, torture, aid, 
free trade, structural adjustment, and other similarly venerated 
doctrines, principles, goals, as well as the whole complex of 
multinational institutions created to defend and advance them. 
Thus it is the international law of the United Nations and its 
principal organs, the law of the International Criminal Court 
(“ICC”), the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), the 
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), the World Bank, as well 
as that of regional bodies such as the North American Treaty 
                                                                                                                            
20.  JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 
(2005). 
21.  See Burns H. Weston, The Role of Law in Promoting Peace and Violence: A Matter 
of Definition, Social Values, and Individual Responsibility, in TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND 
HUMAN DIGNITY 114, 116–17 (W. Michael Reisman & Burns H. Weston eds., 1976); 
Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, 216 RECUEIL DES COURS 
21, 21–22 (1989). 
22.  See Falk, World Order, supra note 14, at 163. 
23.  See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 
Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (annexed to the U.N. Charter). 
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Organization (“NATO”), the African Union, and the 
Organization of American States.   
There are indeed areas of human life where international 
law, understood in a quite restrained sense, is making positive 
contributions today. These areas include what Richard Falk has 
grouped into a category called “the management of complexity.”24 
In international business, for example, rules, practices, and 
authoritative bodies have been developed to facilitate global 
trade and diverse other cross border transactions. Thus 
Microsoft, Apple, Toyota, British Petroleum, Lloyds, CNOOC, 
and other global corporations are able to facilitate their interests 
with the “sanctioned regularity”25 that defines any system of law. 
This is also substantially true with much more modest business 
interests and routine cross border transactions. International law 
also plays important roles in managing expectations and 
interactions across a broad swath of everyday interactions from 
air travel to electronic communications to diplomatic relations. 
The development of international law in these aspects has 
allowed scholars to make large claims such as: 
Every hour of every day ships ply the sea, planes pierce the 
clouds, and artificial satellites roam outer space. Every hour 
of every day communications are transmitted, goods and 
services traded, and people and things transported from 
one country to another . . . . And in all these respects, 
international law . . . is rather well observed on the 
whole . . . .26 
However, even the perceived success of international law in 
these areas should not be accepted uncritically. It should be 
analyzed in context. It is important to recognize that a huge 
number of people are excluded from or deprived of the benefits 
of such transactions even as they absorb the hidden costs. Travel 
and tourism, immigration, global trade and investment, 
intellectual property protections, and routine diplomatic or 
security activities governed by the international order are not 
inherently benign and consistent with the interests of the whole 
of humanity. Examples of “successful” observance of 
                                                                                                                            
24.  See FALK, REVITALIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 14, at 91. 
25.  See Weston, supra note 21, at 117. 
26.  Burns H. Weston, Law and Alternative Security: Toward a Nuclear Weapons-Free 
World, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1077, 1080 (1990).  
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international law are also subject to the critique of functional 
incompetence and doctrinal incoherence made against the 
whole discipline here. The often tragic costs of these rules, 
practices, and bodies are actually not well disguised and could 
be easily seen in environmental devastation, massive corruption, 
and misery policed by public and private violence. As such, these 
successes are less about the triumph or efficacy of law than they 
are about the persistence of unequal relationships and absence 
of pragmatic alternatives. In any case, examples of the 
“successful” operation of international law in these areas make 
its failures in the critical areas discussed here all the more 
revealing about its nature and limits. At a minimum, one should 
ask whether liberal internationalism got carried away in the post 
Second World War era with the music of its own virtues, and so 
promised way more than could be delivered by a functionally 
competent and coherent international legal regime under the 
circumstances. A more humbling or restrained understanding of 
what international law has actually accomplished and is capable 
of accomplishing could free up human and material resources 
from a vain quest for certitude and channel them toward the 
hard politics needed to transform a violent, unstable, and 
structurally unequal global structure.  
II. THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
FROM CHRISTIAN IMPERIAL CONQUEST TO PAX 
AMERICANA 
 
The law of humanity is associated with the future; it is more 
a matter of potentiality than of history or experience.27 
 
Professor Richard Falk has suggested that, “the 
[contemporary] notion of world order is situated between inter-
state law and the law of humanity, although not necessarily at all 
in the middle. The inter-state is presumably the past, a time 
when clearly the inter-state dimension dominated our 
understanding of international law . . . .”28 
                                                                                                                            
27.   Falk, World Order, supra note 14, at 163. 
28.  Id.  
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The attitude of embracing structural changes that would rid 
humanity of the stranglehold of the inter-state order would 
actually be more in keeping with the traditions of early 
doctrinalists and practitioners of international law like Francisco 
de Vitoria and Hugo Grotius, who developed foundational 
aspects of modern international law out of functional necessity.29 
This attitude would also be consistent with the perspectives and 
actions of the interwar and post Second World War generation 
of legal intellectuals and practitioners who refused to allow a 
reluctant stodgy sovereign nation state the privileging field to 
shield either war criminals who claimed to have acted legally 
under laws and superior orders or national leaders who wanted 
the freedom to continue oppressing their citizens.30 
This section briefly reviews how the dominant conception 
of international law came to be. Assorted theologians, moralists, 
policymakers, and lawyers, usually in the service of powerful 
state or corporate interests, have chronicled the form and 
substance of regimes of order, inequality, violent subjugation, 
and plunder since at least the Fifteenth Century. Dutch jurist 
Hugo Grotius’ much celebrated De Jure Belli ac Pacis 31 was 
essentially a restatement of practices that had evolved from 
antiquity that he cautiously recommended to fretful sovereigns 
of a later age busy with savage domination of an expanded world 
and desperate to accumulate resources for ongoing conflicts. 
Grotius, dubbed Father of international law, meticulously built 
on earlier surveys and commentaries by other European 
Christian theologians and jurists like Vasquez, Vitoria, Ayala, 
and Suárez to argue for a more orderly process.32 The “law” 
elaborated by these agents of empire should be understood as a 
useful set of signals, or guidelines to both the weak and the 
powerful on how to behave either to preserve their advantages 
and prosperity or just simply survive under the circumstances. 
                                                                                                                            
29.  See Anghie, Colonial Origins, supra note 15. 
30.  See Thane Rosenbaum, Essay, The Romance of Nuremberg and the Tease of Moral 
Justice, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1731 (2006). See generally TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG 
TRIALS: WAR CRIMES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1949).  
31.  See HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE (1901).  
32.  See Sergio Moratiel Villa, The Philosophy of International Law: Suárez, Grotius and 
Epigones, 37 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 539 (1997).  
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Necessity has often been the springboard for creative 
change in transnational human relations for good or ill. If we 
consider the international law of the present as the direct 
descendant of the regime that began in the late Fifteenth 
Century with “discovery,” and the savage conquest of “lesser” 
others in a supposed new world, we could identify at least four 
subsequent critical periods in which doctrines and policies 
governing “transnational” relations have had to be adjusted to 
solve practical problems and maintain the relevance if not the 
coherence of the regime. Much could be learned from this 
history as we contemplate the possibilities of a future in which 
the interests of humanity, not those of the inter-state order of 
the last several centuries, will be paramount. 
In the first of these critical periods, a sort of pre-Grotius 
“Grotian Moment,” circa 1492, the basic problem facing the 
progenitors of modern international law was how to divide the 
spoils of conquest and new world colonialism between the 
imperial powers, Spain and Portugal. This was resolved, at least 
temporarily, by appeal to Christian imperialism under the 
authority of the Pope.33 Pope Alexander VI issued two papal 
bulls in 1493 that divided the new world between the two 
Western superpowers of the time, Spain and Portugal, in the 
interest of Christianity. The two powers entered into other 
treaties built on this papal law foundation. This Christian 
imperialism-based order of international relations persisted 
within the spheres of European influence until other European 
rulers challenged it from outside divine law to further their 
particular interests. These challenges led to another critical 
moment. 
As more European powers joined in the business of 
plunder outside their home continent, they rejected the 
authority of the Pope both as arbiter of inter-sovereign relations 
as well as relations between European sovereigns and native 
people in other continents. This challenge opened up space for 
a more secular approach to resolving disputes among European 
sovereigns as well as disputes between them and non-Europeans. 
Francisco de Vitoria, a Spanish jurist, helped to fashion a rules-
based process of resolving these disputes. As Professor Antony 
                                                                                                                            
33.  GROVOGUI, supra note 15, at 16–20.  
2013] INCOHERENCE AND INCOMPETENCE 65 
Anghie puts it, Vitoria rejected “old medieval jurisprudence” 
that gave primacy to the Pope, and replaced it with a more 
secular version based on natural law administered by sovereign 
rulers.34 Vitoria saw “the problem [as one] of creating a system 
of law which could be used to account for relations between 
societies which he understood to belong to two very different 
cultural orders . . . .”35 This legal resolution paved the way for 
the complete domination of native people in the New World 
dictated primarily by secular material interests of European 
powers. It gave the various European powers the freedom to 
pursue their expanded national interests while they nurtured 
rules that formed the basis for the present inter-state legal order. 
Hugo Grotius, a loyal subject of Dutch power and lawyer for 
the Dutch East India Company, did not enter the picture until 
several decades after this foundation.36 He focused on how to 
restrain the continuing destructive competition and conflicts 
among the growing number of European potentates attracted to 
conquest and pillage in far away societies.37 It is noteworthy that 
many accounts of modern international law’s origins focus on 
narrower and more benign interpretations of Grotius work, 
ignoring not only its indebtedness to Vitoria but also its essential 
facilitation and rationalization of European as well as royal 
supremacy.38 Grotius’ contributions were largely derivative of 
Vitoria’s. He reaffirmed Vitoria’s secular foundations of an inter-
sovereign or international law. He sanctified the development of 
principles of sovereign equality among European nations in 
order to reduce the destructive consequences of war. He also 
                                                                                                                            
34.  See Anghie, Colonial Origins, supra note 15, at 322.   
35.  Id.  
36.  Hugo Grotius (1583–1645). There were of course many others who preceded 
Grotius and wrote seriously about what we now call international law, including the 
Spaniards Vásquez de Menchaca (1509–1566), Balthazar Ayala (1548–1584), and 
Francisco Suárez (1548–1617). Another important figure in the development of 
international law in that era was the Italian jurist, Albericus Gentilis (1552–1608).  
37.  See GROTIUS, supra note 31.   
38.  See Lauterpacht, supra note 3, at 18–53. Lauterpacht argued that 
“notwithstanding shortcomings of method and defects of substance . . . the principal 
and characteristic features of De Jure Belli ac Pacis are identical with the fundamental 
and persistent problems of international law.” Id. at 18–19. One may accept this 
observation while disagreeing with the post Second World War assertion that 
international law has substantially broken off from its state interest anchor. Desire is 
not a substitute for reality and does not trump experience.  
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helped to heal fractured European imperialism and to make the 
process of colonial domination by Europe of outside peoples 
more orderly, more efficient, and more permanent. Grotius’ 
arguments in defense of freedom of the seas were similarly 
oriented. Grotius argued for humanity and decency as 
consistent with the interests of imperial sovereigns and their 
nascent European nation states. It would be truly an 
exaggeration to suggest that Grotius foresaw a future in which 
the interests of the sovereign would be subordinate to those of 
individuals. 
Another critical moment in the development of rules of 
conduct among European nations occurred in the mid-to-late 
Nineteenth Century and served to refine the processes and 
substance of European imperialism and colonial domination of 
non-Europeans through international law. This is the period 
generally referred to as the Scramble for Africa, a process by 
which European colonialism, now broadened to include once 
marginal players such as Germany, Italy, and Belgium, devised 
rules to make the European partition and pillage of Africa more 
orderly and thus more profitable for the Europeans.39 By this 
time, European powers had jettisoned Christian imperial 
rationalization or divine law for conquest and plunder. A newer 
foundation built on “humanitarian” ideas of spreading 
civilization, the suppression of savagery, promoting free trade, 
and such was now deployed.40 The scramble for Africa occurred 
in conjunction with the ongoing race to dominate much of the 
rest of the world outside Europe. This is also the period in which 
                                                                                                                            
39.  See generally THOMAS PAKENHAM, THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA: THE WHITE 
MAN’S CONQUEST OF THE DARK CONTINENT FROM 1876 TO 1912 (1991). “The Scramble 
for Africa is one of the most extraordinary phenomena in history. In 1880 most of the 
continent was still ruled by its inhabitants and was barely explored. Yet, by 1902, five 
European powers—Britain, France, Germany, Belgium and Italy—had grabbed almost 
all of its ten million square miles, awarding themselves thirty new colonies and 
protectorates, and 110 million bewildered new subjects.” From the Publisher, 
ZENOSBOOK, http://204.93.202.168/our-book-blogs/945-the-scramble-for-africa-the-
white-mans-conquest-ofthe-dark-continent-from-1876-to-1912-by-thomas-pakenham.
html (last visited Nov. 20, 2012) (describing PAKENHAM, supra). 
40.  As David Livingstone stated at his Cambridge University address on 
December 5, 1857, “I beg to direct your attention to Africa; I know that in a few years I 
shall be cut off in that country, which is now open: Do not let it be shut again! I go back 
to Africa to try to make an open path for commerce and Christianity . . . .” See 
PAKENHAM, supra note 39, at 1 (quoting Livinston’s address). See generally ADAM 
HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST (1998). 
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a new more powerful player, the United States, emerged into 
the broader world stage to extend its own unique concept of the 
civilizing mission, or manifest destiny throughout the Americas 
and into Asia.41 The United States provoked a war against Spain 
in 1898, several decades after a similarly manufactured casus belli 
with Mexico, to herald the beginning of its own expansion 
outside of the Americas into Asia.42 It was perhaps fitting that 
Spain, the once great imperial power that initiated the process 
of global conquest by European powers, met its demise through 
an unimagined consequence of its quest. Centuries of efforts to 
create an international law to regulate the process of conquest 
and domination did not protect its spoils from the desires of a 
greater power. 
The most recent moment has given us our present version 
of international law, the specific regime of conquest and 
exploitation under which we are still muddling and in which the 
United States remains the dominant force in the world 
community. The end of the Second World War gave the United 
States extraordinary ideological and material advantages. The 
desire to secure these advantages encouraged it to recast western 
history and power under an overarching vision of a Pax 
Americana, an American-supervised world order bathed, yet 
again, in the language of international law.43 Post-war US 
dominance allowed it to claim the old European mantle of 
civilization’s vicar and to try to rehabilitate the discredited 
memory of past civilizing missions. US economic and military 
supremacy in the post Second World War world gave critical 
ideological and programmatic dominance to its interpretation 
and management of critical aspects of international relations.44 
This includes not only the use of force, human rights, 
                                                                                                                            
41.  See HAROLD EVANS, THE AMERICAN CENTURY 48–67 (1998). Mark Twain 
satirized the pretensions and unmasked the true agenda of the period: “I bring you the 
stately nation named Christendom, returning bedraggled, besmirched, dishonored, 
from pirate raids in Kiaochou, Manchuria, South Africa, and the Philippines, with her 
soul full of meanness, her pocket full of boodle, and her mouth full of pious 
hypocrisies. Give her soap and a towel, but hide the looking glass.” Id. at 50 (quoting 
MARK TWAIN, GREETINGS FROM THE NINETEENTH TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
(1990)); see also DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 303–21 (1998). 
42.  See EVANS, supra note 41, at 62–63.  
43.  See id. at 386–403.  
44.  Id; see also DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 120–77 
(1990).  
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decolonization, and international trade, but also, crucially, how 
we remember the past. Pax Americana recognizes that it should 
separate its processes from the past in order to justify them. The 
ideology of international law is a crucial aspect of this 
recognition. 
Expanded participation by non-state actors in the 
development of international legal doctrines, processes, and 
programs has been a key strategy in reconstituting the vision of 
international law in this period of Pax Americana. The 
international law of this moment also emphasizes recognition of 
the individual as both a subject and object of international law, 
as well as renewed commitment to global economic and cultural 
cooperation. This is the lure of progressive realization, the 
golden object that entices liberal internationalists of all sorts, 
from human rights campaigners and international criminal law 
fetishists to good governance and development world travelers, 
to abide the dissonance in the world and keep striving for 
something better. 
The embrace of this post-war Pax Americana vision of 
international law was so broad and deep that the Cold War 
never seriously challenged its influence. Even those who fought 
Western hegemony had to claim adherence to this vision in 
form and substance in order to advance their particular 
concerns or simply to be tolerated. Algerian jurist Mohammed 
Bedjaoui, for example, spoke of a “heavily darkened 
international horizon,” and about “distress for some, anxiety for 
others, and destitution for most” in his seminal address, “No 
Development Without Peace, No Peace Without 
Development.”45 Yet, his prescriptions for change fell well within 
the existing liberal international order. It was a call for dialogue, 
for reform, and not a radical restructuring of the international 
order.46 The broader decolonization and economic self-
determination movements eventually succumbed because at 
their core, they were creations of the moment. 
It is the case that states gave up important elements of 
sovereign power to join the United Nations and other 
transnational institutions underpinning the post-war global 
                                                                                                                            
45.  See Bedjaoui, supra note 16, at 178.  
46.  Id. at 178–83.  
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order. States have also yielded to a multitude of international 
agreements that seek to restrain state power and enhance the 
freedoms of non-state actors. Witness the manner in which the 
ad-hoc international criminal tribunals and the International 
Criminal Court have been embraced by the very actors who are 
most likely to be impacted negatively by its operation. Note also 
the significant devolution of state economic power to the World 
Bank, the IMF, and the adjudicative panels of the WTO. 
However, in reality, it is the weakest of the states that have had 
to make substantive concessions. As far as the more powerful 
states are concerned, these commitments remain entirely 
subject to how they perceive their national imperatives. The 
United States had no legal difficulty torturing international 
terror suspects, China is still in Tibet, Russia’s war against 
separatists remain outside international legal supervision, India, 
Pakistan, Israel have illegally developed nuclear weapons, and 
Iran moves toward developing the same. A major incentive for 
some of those who support this refurbished vision of 
international law has been the belief that it is the best hope for 
humanity, and that a commitment to hope backed by a common 
acceptance of a strategy of progressive realization gave them a 
better chance of remaking the savage world they had inherited. 
But it is time to ask in the manner of the poet whether:  
Hope was ever on her mountain, watching 
till the day begun— 
Crown’d with sunlight—over darkness— 
from the still unrisen sun.47 
Truly, what has changed? Have the post war limitations of 
state power, the growth of international institutions, the 
entrance of new subjects of international law, the promotion of 
international criminal accountability, really challenged the 
status quo that old international law helped to defend? What 
good were the limitations of UN doctrine of jus ad bellum when 
the United States under President Bush wanted to go to war 
against Iraq? Did the Convention against Torture form an 
actionable barrier to torture in the US War on Terror? What 
role has the opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 
nuclear weapons possession and use played on the growing 
                                                                                                                            
47.  ALFRED LORD TENNYSON, LOCKSLEY HALL SIXTY YEARS AFTER 465 (1886).  
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threat of nuclear catastrophe? Is the International Criminal 
Court engaged in promoting justice or re-affirming that savagery 
is essentially the province of the dispossessed? Was the turn to 
MDGs not a reaffirmation that global inequality and misery are 
outside law and subject to the generosity or lack thereof of the 
haves?   
In terms of its rhetoric and promises, the international law 
that emanated from the post Second World War’s “Grotian 
Moment” of history was actually a radical restatement of how 
international law had long functioned. What used to be a 
modest, slowly evolving and indeed rather restrained effort to 
get first Christian, later secular powers, to play nice with each 
other was reinterpreted to justify a full blown assault on global 
disorder in an American-led campaign to create a new world 
order that would have provoked envy from Alexander the Great 
or Julius Caesar. The deliberate strategic decision by American-
led allied powers to cast the decisive defeat of their Second 
World War enemies in timeless moral language, elevated and 
sanctioned by multinational institutions and legal proceedings, 
was an audacious success. It erased enormous inconvenient 
chapters of their own histories. Even the most outrageous 
behavior only a few decades old, such as the European partition 
and colonization of Africa or the conquest of Spain’s former 
colonies by the United States seemed cleansed by this recasting 
of the victors as defenders of a timeless secular faith backed by 
law. Furthermore, exaggerated assertions of actually quite 
incoherent and indeterminate principles in a brave new world of 
supposed sovereign equality covered up tragic realities such as 
that there were more-than-equal members of the UN Security 
Council with vetoes, that a few more-than-equal states possessed 
nuclear weapons, that a tiny number of more-than-equal states 
possessed the might to intervene militarily and subvert 
unfriendly regimes, and that a few more-than-equal states 
controlled the international economic order. 
The establishment of the international human rights 
movement was perhaps the greatest innovation of the post war 
liberal international world orderists. The movement franchised 
the creation of a new world order, enlisting citizen idealists in 
the center and periphery of imperialism in the spread of the 
new joyful ideology of Western supremacy. Civil society was thus 
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co-opted as humanitarian imperialists to continue the tradition 
of civilizing missions to suppress native savagery in far off places. 
Core justifications such as the primacy of the right to self-
determination of peoples ignored the inconvenient truth that 
the resulting states were often the deadliest threat faced by their 
citizens and that in any case, oppressed peoples often have to 
keep fighting terrible wars against other peoples to keep their 
supposed birthright. The movement also unwittingly conspired 
to normalize the unspeakable horror of everyday misery by 
relegating economic, social, and development imperatives to 
mere aspirations. 
The spectacular embrace of this new post Second World 
War iteration of international law is reflected in the 
innumerable international agreements, ceaseless gatherings, 
and a multitude of international bodies that serve to secure the 
privileges of the powerful, while devising more roles and 
opportunities in the international order for self-righteous 
international bureaucrats and aspiring do-gooders whose 
necessary supervisory work will, of course, never end. 
A. Incoherence and Functional Incompetence 
Liberal critics of international law have generally reconciled 
themselves into two camps: the pragmatic reformers, who persist 
with the next law suit, aid project, initiative, conference, 
guidelines, protocols, convention, or demand for humanitarian 
interventions, and the “Grotian Moment” theorists, who watch 
eagerly for the next great crisis that would open our eyes to the 
need and possibilities of fundamental change that would finally 
give us the international law promised to us by someone or 
something (nature, self or collective interest).48 Both camps are 
seriously mistaken. Reviewing the history of international law’s 
development, going back to 1492, it is clear that international 
law has not justified such a privileged position. Perhaps nothing 
should be that privileged. For one thing, international law has 
not been shorn of it historic function to define, interpret, and 
implement the rules for domination and submission among 
                                                                                                                            
48.  These “internal” critics should be distinguished from those who deny the 
existence of international law or reduce it to an appendage of international politics.  
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organized groups of humans, presently constituted at least 
formally as states or nations.49 
Why persist with this charade? Why not admit the doctrinal 
incoherence and functional incompetence of post Second 
World War international law, and embrace, even hasten, its 
demise? Why engage in rhetorical excesses like “the mightiest 
nations on earth bowed to the demands of smaller countries for 
recognition of a common standard by which rights and wrongs 
of every nation’s behavior could be measured?”50 Some of this 
reflects the enduring pull of utopianism, or the vanity that 
allows some to persist with the myth of enduring solutions that 
only law could provide to the living. Undoubtedly, there is also 
credible fear that something terrible or worse may develop in a 
vacuum unfilled by a vision of law no matter how fragile. But do 
we need international law to tell us that genocide and crimes 
against humanity are bad? Does the regime prevent more 
genocide and crimes against humanity? Without international 
law would we have more wars than what we have had? Is it 
international law that is keeping more people from joining the 
ranks of those surviving on less than a dollar a day? Would we be 
more destructive of the environment or more oppressive to 
women and disfavored minorities without international law? In 
truth, what does international law have to do with anything that 
is of vital importance to humanity as a whole today? This Article 
examines the threat of nuclear annihilation, destructive conflicts 
in the Middle East, and globalized misery to illustrate the 
incoherence and inconsequence of international law to how we 
struggle with these critical issues.  
B. Avoiding Catastrophe  
 
In the Twenty-first Century, humanity will likely burn out in 
a nuclear holocaust or fade away amid the gradually 
mounting effects of climate change. That was Noam 
Chomsky’s prediction during a question-and-answer session 
in 2009 that still resonates today. By moving forward with a 
                                                                                                                            
49.  See generally GROVOGUI, supra note 15, at 16–20; Anghie, Colonial Origins, supra 
note 15, at 321–36.  
50.  GLENDON, supra note 6, at xv. 
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missile defense policy that upsets the balance of nuclear 
deterrence with Russia, “we’re consciously increasing the 
threat of nuclear war,” Chomsky said. As for the effects of 
climate change, “nobody knows the exact details, but 
everybody knows that the longer you wait, the worse it’s 
going to be.”51 
 
1. Climate Change 
 
Already, glaciers are melting, heat waves and heavy rains are 
increasing, the food system is under stress and the sea is 
rising. The best that can be hoped for, scientists say, is to 
limit the damage slow enough to provide society more time 
to adjust.52 
 
There is solid international consensus today on the threat 
posed to humanity by global warming and climate change and 
considerable efforts have been made by diverse collection of 
people across to the world to meet the challenges.53 There is 
clear understanding today that efforts to deal with this urgent 
threat to communities around the world should involve 
everyone, and should be coordinated across the world. This is 
not a problem that any one nation can fix, no matter how 
powerful or committed. As such, the United Nations has become 
a critical forum for encouraging, supporting, and coordinating 
initiatives to deal with climate change. With a matter of this 
                                                                                                                            
51.  Noam Chomsky, Address to On The Earth Productions and The Nation: If 
Nuclear War Doesn’t Get Us, Climate Change Will (Mar. 28, 2013), available at 
http://www.thenation.com/video/173205/noam-chomsky-if-nuclear-war-doesnt-get-us-
climate-change-will.  
52.  Justin Gillis, Obama Puts Legacy at Stake With Clean Air Act, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/science/earth/clean-air-act-reinterpreted
-would-focus-on-flexibility-and-state-level-efforts.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
53.  See Ruth Gordon, Climate Change and the Poorest Nations: Further Reflections on 
Global Inequality, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1559, 1623–24 (2007). Gordon highlights the 
particular vulnerability of poorer nations to climate change and its consequences. She 
concludes that the economic interests of the most powerful nation will prevent action 
on this issue “until the consequences become intolerable.” Id. at 1623. She adds that 
“the peoples of small island nations, the lowest income nations, and the inhabitants of 
rapidly deteriorating habitats such as the Arctic region have no voice in this scenario 
and will suffer until it is in the interests of the powerful to take a different path.” Id.  
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urgency and with undeniable recognition of the need to take 
immediate and extraordinary steps to mitigate and arrest the 
slide toward devastating consequences for humanity, one would 
expect that the machinery of international legality would be at 
its best. This has not been the case. While so much of the efforts 
have gone toward employing international law as the foundation 
for legitimate and efficacious action, the reality is that 
international law, in any sense, has been a sideshow. The fitful 
movements that have occurred have been without regard to 
international law. With regard to climate change, international 
law, whether of the traditional sort or the post Second World 
War variety, has not been a significant contributor in any 
substantive sense. The realities of international politics have 
prevailed. 
An examination of the journey toward global consensus on 
climate change illustrates brightly the very limited capacity of 
international law on this matter of utmost importance. Several 
decades of warnings from scientists and others beginning in the 
1960s about increasing concentrations of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere and related steady increases in global temperatures 
eventually nudged an international response to the problem. 
The first World Climate Conference took place in 1979. The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”), whose 
reports have been critical to subsequent international responses 
to climate change, was set up in 1988.54 The first global legal 
response to the developing crisis was the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), adopted at the 
Earth Summit in 1992.55 That document, although consciously 
limited in its legal capacity, provided a foundation upon which 
international legal action could be taken.56 It acknowledged 
                                                                                                                            
54.  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) was established 
in 1988 jointly by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nation 
Environmental Programme (“UNEP”). Organization, INTERNGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml#.UlroCm
R4ZDE (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).  
55.  See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 
1771 U.N.T.S. 107, 165, 31 I.L.M. 849 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. The Convention has 195 
Parties. Id.  
56.  The UNFCCC includes a broad list of commitments.  These commitments 
employed non-binding but exhortatory language, such as “develop,” “formulate,” 
“promote,” “cooperate,” and “communicate” to encourage individual state and 
collective actions to mitigate climate change without any hint of sanctions. Id. art. 4. 
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“that change in the Earth’s climate and its adverse effects are a 
common concern of human kind.”57 Its contributions as a 
document of collective understanding of the problem, an 
affirmation of the necessity for urgent action, and a source for 
the best practices in responding to this impending calamity 
should be appreciated.58 Yet, it is not a source of law or binding 
obligations.59 Worse, its efforts to masquerade as such diminish 
the meaning and value of law. In this manner, it continues a 
tradition in the modern era that goes back to the UDHR and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. Of course, the value of such instruments as vehicles for 
enterprising academics and activists to squeeze notions of 
binding obligations useful only in theoretical discourse is not in 
dispute here. That is not a sufficient reason, however, to 
mischaracterize the reality of international politics, and the 
quite limited reach and capacity of international law. 
The Kyoto Protocol (the “Protocol”) was developed later to 
operationalize the UNFCCC.60 Although adopted in 1997, it did 
not enter into force until 2005. The United States signed the 
Protocol but in the face of broad-based hostility in the United 
States Senate, it has not been presented for ratification.61 Many 
                                                                                                                            
The document affirms the collective understanding of the problem and catalogues best 
practices in the service of a global priority. Id.    
57.  See id. pmbl.  
58.  Id. art. 2. The UNFCC explicity states that: 
The ultimate objective of the Convention and any related legal instruments 
that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with 
the relevant provisions of the convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be 
achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystem to adapt naturally 
to climate change, to ensure food production is not threatened and 
economic development to proceed in a sustainable way. 
Id. 
59.  The Convention’s dispute settlement provisions generally leave it to the 
parties to decide how to settle disputes that may arise among them “concerning the 
interpretation or application of the convention.” Id. art. 14(1). However, parties are 
given the option of making provisions of the convention binding and to choose the 
International Court of Justice or international arbitration for resolution. Id. art. 14(2). 
60.  Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, UN Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22. The Protocol 
has 191 parties as of 2013. 
61.  According to a news report: 
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US leaders were upset that China and India had been among 
those countries not required to make commitments.62 Further 
Canada, Japan, and Russia have either withdrawn their support 
of the Protocol or limited their participation in its targets.63 The 
Protocol too fell short as a legal document although its 
contributions as a global call for specific actions to mitigate 
climate change should not be minimized. The Protocol 
reaffirmed the ultimate objective contained in article 2 of the 
UNFCCC, and employed the same weak dispute resolution 
process contained in the Convention. The Protocol was 
supposed to go beyond the efforts of the Convention to legally 
bind developed countries to emission reduction targets within 
specific time periods. The Protocol, employing the principle of 
“common but differentiated responsibility,” sets binding 
emission targets only for thirty-seven industrialized countries 
and the European community in its first commitment period 
ending 2012. This principle of common but differentiated 
responsibility “recognizes that they [industrialized nations] are 
largely responsible for the current high levels of greenhouse gas 
emissions in the atmosphere, which are the results of 150 years 
of industrial activity.”64 
As the first commitment period of the Protocol came to a 
close, Parties gathered in Doha, Qatar in December 2012 to 
assess progress and map future efforts. The Doha meeting was 
compromised by several factors including the general lack of 
significant progress toward mitigation even by those parties that 
                                                                                                                            
Sen. Larry E. Craig (Idaho), head of the Republican Policy Committee, told 
reporters here that the treaty is “designed to give some nations a free ride, it 
is designed to raise energy prices in the United States and it is designed to 
perpetuate a new U.N. bureaucracy to manage global resource allocation.” It 
also would undermine the recent reform of farm programs and threaten U.S. 
agricultural production, warned Sen. Pat Roberts (R-Kan.). 
Helen Dewar & Kevin Sullivan, Senate Republicans Call Kyoto Pact Dead, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 11, 1997, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/climate/
stories/clim121197b.htm. 
62.  See id.  
63.  Regan Doherty & Barbara Lewis, Doha Climate Talks Throw a Lifeline to Kyoto 
Protocol, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2012, 2:44 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/
08/us-climate-talks-idUSBRE8B60QU20121208. 
64.  See Making Those First Steps Count: An Introduction to the Kyoto Protocol, U.N. 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential_
background/kyoto_protocol/items/6034txt.php. 
2013] INCOHERENCE AND INCOMPETENCE 77 
had made commitments, the failure of the United States to ratify 
the agreement, and the withdrawal of commitments by Russia, 
Japan, New Zealand, and Canada. Added to this was the 
outstanding dispute over the failure to require commitments 
from two rapidly industrializing powerhouses, China and India. 
As one observer put it, “overall, the result is that global 
emissions have showed no sign of slowing down . . . . In that 
sense, the Kyoto protocol has been a failure. But it was 
unquestionably an important first step in global climate 
diplomacy.”65 
In Doha, Parties to the Protocol decided to push difficult 
decisions about how to deal with climate change to the future. 
They agreed to extend the Protocol until 2020. According to 
one assessment, Kyoto was “sapped by the withdrawal of Russia, 
Japan, and Canada and its remaining backers, led by the 
European Union and Australia, now account for just 15 percent 
of world greenhouse gas emissions.”66 Another observer at the 
talks states that, “there’s a huge disconnect between the urgency 
on the outside and what happens here.”67 
The results of the conclaves in Doha and Kyoto, and all the 
numerous other gatherings and initiatives to deal with the 
challenges posed by this threat to human survival suggest the 
foundational weaknesses in international politics focused 
through a lens of international legality. When it comes to 
dealing with matters that could require the most powerful 
nations to sacrifice even a little of their national advantages, no 
matter how temporary or ephemeral in the long run, law as law 
finds little support.68 The tragedy of our collective impotence is 
                                                                                                                            
65.  Duncan Clark, Has the Kyoto Protocol Made Any Difference to Carbon Emissions?, 
Environment, GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2012, 5:39 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/
environment/blog/2012/nov/26/kyoto-protocol-carbon-emissions. 
66.  Doherty & Lewis, supra note 63. 
67.  Id. (quoting Jennifer Haverkamp, of the Environmental Defense Fund). 
68.  John Vidal captures the reality of global climate change politics: 
Evidence of global warming mounts both on the ground and in science, but 
in the bubble world of international climate diplomacy, little happens. 
Countries have become less and less able to collectively address the crisis 
unfolding around them. When UN talks fell apart in Copenhagen in 2009, 
world leaders claimed they could cobble together a new binding agreement 
to cut emissions within six months. That became a year, then two years, and 
now the rich countries tell a bemused public that it will be 2015 at the earliest 
before a final agreement will be reached. Trillions of dollars can be found to 
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compounded when we rush to attach the language of law to 
even the most modest of accomplishments. Calling it soft law in 
such instances merely signals uncreative desperation. As we see 
with regard to Kyoto, the more likely substantive outcome is a 
breakdown in communication and cooperation as nations 
devote substantial energy to ensure that they are not giving up 
their capacities to act consistent with their national interests in 
the future. Whatever progress one can discern with regard to 
climate change mitigation, it has had nothing to do with law. If 
anything legalism has been a hindrance. We cannot escape 
politics by intoning law, especially when it affects nations with 
sufficient power and influence. On the other hand, one can 
credit the international political process with spurring diverse 
creative domestic and cooperative international efforts to deal 
with climate change.69 These efforts are not occurring because 
of the threats posed by some sort of international sanctions. The 
role of international work in this arena has been to develop the 
science, communicate urgency, and build consensus on the best 
mitigation practices. It would be ironic if climate change, a 
global crisis that requires the powerful to give up something and 
a crisis that could not be solved by simply taking more from the 
weak, ends up highlighting the overreach of international law 
on other issues. 
2. Nuclear Annihilation 
The General Assembly, . . . 
1. Declares that: . . . 
(c) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is a war 
directed not against an enemy or enemies alone but also 
against mankind in general . . . 
                                                                                                                            
bail out banks in a few months, but the world’s most experienced negotiators 
cannot find a way to get Americans, the British or anyone to just turn down 
the air conditioning or lag their roofs to reduce the amount of energy they 
use. 
John Vidal, Time Is Running Out: The Doha Climate Talks Must Put an End to Excuses, 
GUARDIAN, Nov. 25, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/nov/
25/doha-climate-talks-end-to-excuses. 
69.  The president’s 2013 initiatives on climate change focus on what was 
achievable within domestic United States political structure. See, e.g., Gillis, supra note 
52.  
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(d) Any State using nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is 
to be considered as violating the Charter of the United 
Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as 
committing a crime against mankind and civilization.70  
Nevertheless, the Court considers that it does not have 
sufficient elements to enable it to conclude with certainty 
that the use of nuclear weapons would necessarily be at 
variance with principles and rules of law applicable in 
armed conflict in any circumstance.71 
 
Just over a decade ago, US President George W. Bush and 
his top advisers built a case for war against Iraq by emphasizing 
the threat of weapons of mass destruction (“WMD”), especially 
nuclear weapons, under the control of a “rogue” regime or 
terrorists.72 Despite substantial resistance from much of the 
world, the invasion of Iraq proceeded.73 Eventually, it was 
conceded that the WMD fears in that particular instance were at 
best exaggerated or worse, entirely fabricated74 This conclusion 
has hardly impacted US power and prestige in the world. On the 
contrary, the coalition that prosecuted a war, justified 
erroneously or maliciously by fears of WMD, is being re-
assembled to go to war again over nuclear weapons. President 
Barack Obama recently stated that Iran was proceeding with the 
development of nuclear weaponry against the wishes of the 
international community. He claimed that Iran was just over one 
year away from developing nuclear weapons capabilities and 
                                                                                                                            
70.  Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermo-Nuclear 
Weapons, G.A. Res. 1653 (XVI), at 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1653 (XVI) (Nov. 24, 1961).  
71.  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, at 262–63 (July 8). 
72.  President George W. Bush, Address on the Start of the War in Iraq (Mar. 19, 
2003), available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/20/iraq.georgebush 
(“Our nation enters this conflict reluctantly, yet our purpose is sure. The people of the 
United States and our friends and allies will not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime 
that threatens the peace with weapons of mass murder.”); see also Top Bush Officials Push 
Case Aginst Saddam, CNN (Sept. 8, 2002, 8:46 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2002/
ALLPOLITICS/09/08/iraq.debate.  
73.  See Ewen MacAskill & Julian Borger, The Iraq War Was Illegal and Breached UN 
Charter, Says Annan, GUARDIAN, (Sept. 15, 2004, 9:28 PM), http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/16/iraq.iraq.  
74.  See Hans Blix, Iraq War Was a Terrible Mistake and Violation of U.N. Charter, 
CNN (Mar. 19, 2013, 4:36 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/18/opinion/iraq-war-
hans-blix/index.html.  
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reaffirmed the US commitment to using whatever means to 
deny Iran such capabilities.75 
Whether or not the United States alone, or in conjunction 
with other nations, eventually prosecutes war with Iran over 
Iran’s supposed desire or efforts to develop nuclear weapons, 
the expectations that international law could help discipline the 
possession or use of nuclear weapons have not been met. 
Professor Nanda’s work on nuclear weapons and human security 
captures the long and frustrating international efforts to gain 
control over this clear threat to humanity.76 Those efforts began 
in 1946, not long after the tragic demonstration of the weapon’s 
potential for massive destruction. Since that time, calls for 
elimination of nuclear weapons have persisted and multiplied.77 
The “commitment of the international community to the goal of 
the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the creation of a 
nuclear-weapon-free world” has been a standard expression of 
this endeavor.78 
The heart of international law’s contribution to a nuclear-
free world has been the 1968 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (“NPT”).79 In essence, the NPT proposed a 
grand bargain between what may be termed the haves and have-
nots of the atomic age.80 In sum, the haves agreed to retain their 
weapons until they should agree in the future, after 
negotiations, to disarm. In the meantime, they promised to 
share any potential benefits of nuclear technology, except for 
the deadly aspects, with the have-nots. In turn, the have-nots 
agree to limit themselves only to peaceful applications of 
nuclear technology and not to obtain nuclear weapons 
technology or weaponry. It is important to note that no party in 
possession of nuclear weapons offered to destroy their cache or 
put it under international control. Instead, the great hope for 
                                                                                                                            
75.  See Michael D. Shear & David E. Sanger, Iran Nuclear Weapons to Take Year or 
More, Obama Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/15/
world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-weapon-to-take-year-or-more-obama-says.html.  
76.  See Ved P. Nanda, Nuclear Weapons, Human Security and International Law, 37 
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 331 (2009).  
77.  See id. at 337.  
78.  See, e.g., G.A. Res. 52/38 L, 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/38 L (Jan. 8, 1998).  
79.  Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 
483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.  
80.  See id. arts. I–VI.  
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humanity was contained in Article VI of the NPT under which 
parties agreed to undertake good faith negotiations on effective 
measures to halt the arms race and on a future treaty to disarm 
completely “under strict and effective international control.”81 
Curiously though, the NPT permits any party to exercise their 
sovereign right to withdraw from the treaty at any time “if it 
decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter 
of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its 
country.”82 
The 1996 International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) Advisory 
Opinion on the “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons” confirmed the incoherence and functional 
incompetence of international law in this critical area.83 The 
opinion was issued at the request of the UN General Assembly 
pursuant to Article 96 of the UN Charter and Article 65 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice.84 The General 
Assembly asked this question: “Is threat or use of nuclear 
weapons in any circumstances permitted under international 
law?” Faced with a fundamental existential question the court, 
statutorily the most important arbiter of international law 
replied incoherently and inconsequently. The Court decidedly 
rejected the view of a minority of judges that the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons should be unlawful under all circumstances.85 
The court could not agree on whether international law as it 
existed at the time made the threat or use of nuclear weapons 
“lawful or unlawful in the extreme circumstance of self-defence, 
in which the very survival of a state would be at stake.”86 
However, the court ruled that the “threat or use of force by 
                                                                                                                            
81.  Id. art. VI.  
82.  See id. art. X (“Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the 
right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the 
subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.”).  
83.  See generally Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 71.  
84.  See U.N. Charter art. 96, para. 1 (“The General Assembly or the Security 
Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on 
any legal question.”); Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 65, June 26, 
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (annexed to U.N. Charter) (authorizing the court 
to “give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may 
be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such 
a request”).  
85.  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 71.  
86.  Id. at 263.  
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means of nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article 2(4) of the 
United Nations Charter and that fails to meet all the 
requirements of Article 51, is unlawful” and that the “threat or 
use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the 
requirements of the international law applicable in armed 
conflict, particularly those of the principles and rules of 
international humanitarian law, as well as with specific 
obligations” under agreements dealing with nuclear weapons.87 
Essentially the court’s response demonstrated that when it 
comes to the threat or use of force, states have considerable 
flexibility under international law unless they have first 
specifically agreed otherwise. Furthermore, every considered 
international law constraint on the use of force was subject to 
one or more equally valid principles permitting the use of such 
force, especially when it comes to self-preservation of the state. 
The prohibition on use of force, for example, is subject to 
two critical exceptions: individual or collective self-defense and 
UN Security Council authorization. The concept of self-defense 
has become increasingly elastic as weaponry and delivery 
capabilities have become more threatening. Nuclear weapon 
technology, together with ballistic missile and miniaturization 
capabilities, has helped to broaden the acceptable range of self-
defense measures that states may pursue. Protection or security 
as such comes today not from international law prohibiting the 
use of force but from mutual threats or deterrence. Thus, states 
are incentivised to fill the regulatory vacuum in international 
relations with lethal capabilities. With regard to Security Council 
authorization to use force, the practice of the international 
community has created a flexible interpretation of what 
constitutes legal authorization. This reality also encourages 
states not to rely on perceived rules in this area but instead to 
build up their own capabilities. 
                                                                                                                            
87.  See id. at 266; see also INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 4TH EDITION, 
supra note 3, at 448. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter obligated UN members to “refrain 
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations.“ U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. UN Charter 
Article 51 reaffirmed the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an 
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.” U.N. Charter art. 51.  
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The ICJ opinion acknowledged that, “the Charter neither 
expressly prohibits, nor permits, the use of any specific weapon, 
including nuclear weapons.”88 Moreover, according to the 
Court, while “international customary and treaty law does not 
contain any specific prescription authorizing the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons or any other weapon in general or in certain 
circumstances, in particular those of the exercise of legitimate 
self-defense,” there is also no “principle or rule of international 
law which would make the legality of the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons or of any other weapons dependent on a specific 
authorization.”89 All that was left to the Court were insinuations 
of legal standards built on the concept of proportionality. This 
singularly incoherent concept dissolves into absurdities when 
the issue is nuclear weapons and the possibility of nuclear 
conflagration. 
More than four decades after the NPT entered into force 
and nearly seven decades since the earliest efforts to contain the 
spread of nuclear weapons, international law, so to speak, has 
reached the level of its incompetence when it comes to 
preventing nuclear annihilation. Today, international law in this 
area has been reduced to rationalizing the right of nations that 
currently possess nuclear weapons to wage war against states 
without nuclear weapons in the name of preventing those states 
from having the same. In other words, if you choose now to have 
nuclear weapons, you may be prevented by force supposedly 
backed by international law from doing so, even though no 
mechanism exists under this interpretation of international law 
to make those who already have nuclear weapons give them up. 
Meanwhile, the especially odious regime in North Korea 
employs its alleged nuclear capabilities to demand international 
attention and more tribute, confirming the perspicacity of 
countries like India, Pakistan, and Israel that successfully 
obtained nuclear weapons in disregard of international 
sentiments masquerading as law. International law’s 
incoherence and functional incompetence with regard to 
avoiding catastrophe stand exposed. 
                                                                                                                            
88.  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 71, at 244 
89.  See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 71, at 247.  
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The reason international law has turned out to be of no 
help in restraining nuclear weapons possession and the 
inevitable threat of use is buried in its origins and essential 
characteristics. International law has developed to legitimate 
power among those who already have power. International law 
does not discover or confer new powers or rights on those who 
merely would like to have it or claim to deserve it.90 This was true 
back in its infancy in the period of conquests. It has remained so 
despite all the Grotian Moments one could conceive up to now. 
Without some radical re-conception of how humans see their 
relationships to each other in the world, there is no basis to 
imagine a change in the offing. 
Previously, many international law scholars and activists 
understood this harsh reality of international law and made no 
pretense it was otherwise. They limited themselves properly to 
restrained but creative appeals to morality and the common 
interest of sovereigns and states. Post war liberal 
internationalism sought to justify the status quo of the 
immediate post war era, and market it exuberantly as 
international law, objective, neutral, and beyond politics or 
social contestation. Some have chosen not to play along when it 
does not suit their interests. 
Professor Ved Nanda’s 2009 article on nuclear weapons, 
human security, and international law urges a role for 
international law “to provide a framework for nuclear 
disarmament, a prerequisite for human security.”91 He argues 
that, “the end of the Cold War did not remove the threat 
nuclear weapons pose to human civilization . . . . Numerous 
experts point to a causal relationship between nuclear weapons 
and international and national insecurity.”92 The role of 
                                                                                                                            
90.  See, for example, the film “Unforgiven,” in which the Clint Eastwood 
character, William Munny, informs Sheriff Bill, “Deserve’s got nothin to do with it.” 
Sherriff Bill’s protest (“I don’t deserve this—to die like this. I was building a house”) 
echoes the claims and protests of too many seeking to change the status quo in 
international relations through the development and application of international law. 
UNFORGIVEN (Warner Bros. 1992); see also Ruth Buchanan & Rebecca Johnson, The 
Unforgiven Sources of International Law: Nation-Building, Violence and Gender in the 
West(ern), in INTERNATIONAL LAW: MODERN FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 131 (Doris Buss & 
Ambreena Manji eds., 2005). 
91.  Nanda, supra note 76, at 331. 
92.  Id. 
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international law is to provide a framework for nuclear 
disarmament, a prerequisite for human security.93 
Nanda’s call echoes Grotius’ appeal to European sovereigns 
to embrace rules for building peace and managing destructive 
conflicts. Nanda’s work reminds of the horrendous legacy of the 
use of nuclear weapons even at its infancy and affirms the 
objective reality of the limited utility of nuclear weapons as 
instruments of war and domination.94 President Obama has 
called for the United States and Russia to agree to a reduction of 
each country’s nuclear arsenal to just over 1,000.95 Many 
influential parties in both the United States and Russia have 
objected to this initiative.96 Both nations are estimated to still 
have hundreds of nuclear weapons targeted at each other on 
“high alert,” ready to be launched within minutes of a perceived 
threat.97 The US Senate has also failed to ratify the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (“CTBT”) signed by 
the United States in 1996.98 This treaty is still not in force even 
though it has been ratified by 156 countries. Under its terms, 
key possessors of nuclear weapons that participated in the 
negotiations must first ratify before it can become operative.99 
Yet, the problem here is that nuclear weapons and other 
weapons of mass destruction confer the most extraordinary 
                                                                                                                            
93.  Id. 
94.  Id. at 346. 
95.  See Lawrence M. Krauss, Letting Go of Our Nukes, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/opinion/sunday/letting-go-of-our-nukes.html. 
96.  Id. 
97.  Id. 
98.  The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (“CTBT”) opened for 
signatures of state parties in 1996. Under the CTBT: 
(1) Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test 
explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any 
such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control; (2) Each 
State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or 
in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test 
explosion or any other nuclear explosion. 
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty art I, Sept. 24, 1996, UN Doc 
A50/1027 Annex, 35 I.L.M. 1439. See Lawrence Kraus, It’s Time for the U.S. To Finally 
Sign the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, SLATE (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.slate.com/articles/
technology/future_tense/2012/04/comprehensive_
nuclear_test_ban_treaty_the_u_s_should_ratify_it_now_.html; see also Jenifer Mackby, 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, CTR, FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Jan. 23, 
2012), http://csis.org/publication/comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty-0.  
99.  See Mackby, supra note 98.  
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benefits desired by states since the latter’s fitful emergence in 
the mid 1600s: possession of nuclear weapons provides a hedge 
against domination by others and non-existence. This is why 
regimes in countries as diverse as China, India, Pakistan, and 
Israel have obtained them and continued to perfect their 
capacities to employ them. Nuclear weapons possession reveals 
that the true foundational imperative of a state-based 
international system is the existence of the state. Post Second 
World War international law offered the bold claim that it could 
transform such state interests in a world of extremes into the 
interest of humanity as a whole. The stalemate in disarmament 
efforts, the embrace of mutual deterrence, and the resort to 
threats and violence to prevent other states from joining the 
nuclear club show the limits of that claim and affirm the 
centrality of national interests, as opposed to the more abstract 
notion of the interests of humanity, in our global system. 
Meanwhile, “[t]he barrage of threats from North Korea has 
sparked talk from within South Korea of the need to develop its 
own nuclear weapons. A recent poll shows that two-thirds of 
South Korean citizens surveyed support the idea.”100 
C. Containing Destructive Conflicts 
 
In new and wild communities where there is violence, an 
honest man must protect himself; and until other means of 
securing his safety are devised, it is both foolish and wicked 
to persuade him to surrender his arms while the men who 
are dangerous to the community retain theirs. He should 
not renounce the right to protect himself by his own efforts 
until the community is so organized that it can effectively 
relieve the individual of the duty of putting down violence. 
So it is with nations.101 
 
The 2003 Iraq War and the ongoing Syrian civil war are just 
two instances in which the post Second World War international 
                                                                                                                            
100.  K.J. Kwon, Under Threat, South Koreans Mull Nuclear Weapons, CNN (Mar. 18, 
2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/18/world/asia/south-korea-nuclear.  
101.  Theodore Roosevelt, Address Before the Nobel Prize Committee: 
International Peace (May 5, 1910), available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_
prizes/peace/laureates/1906/roosevelt-lecture.html.  
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legal architecture designed to contain destructive international 
and national conflicts has failed. The Iraq War was a classic 
international conflict, but the ongoing destruction in Syria, 
ostensibly a civil war, represents the more common arena in 
which international law’s doctrinal incoherence and functional 
incompetence with regard to the containment of destructive 
conflicts have been exposed. Today, the cause of peace is 
essentially the foundation for interminable conflicts 
unrestrained, if they ever were, by borders. The cause of peace is 
also the fuel for an escalating and competitive global weapons 
trade, whose regulation continues to elude the international 
community.102 
Containing warfare and promoting peace and security 
among sovereign entities are age-old concerns among those who 
have promoted the development of international law from the 
earliest period.103 Doctrinalists like Vitoria, Ayala, Vazquez, and 
Grotius affirmatively argued in the interest of peace for rules 
limiting the unbridled right of sovereigns to declare and wage 
wars.104 The Twentieth Century saw significant progress that led 
to agreements such as the 1907 Hague Convention (No. IV),105 
and the 1928 General Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of 
War as an Instrument of National Policy.106 But, it took the 
Second World War and the ascendance of the United States as 
the preeminent world power to bring an energized vision of law, 
with all its contradictions, to the forefront of international 
                                                                                                                            
102.  See The ‘Big Six’ Arms Exporters, AMNESTY INT’L (June 11, 2012), 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/big-six-arms-exporters-2012-06-11. The UN General 
Assembly adopted the first international agreement regulating the international arms 
trade in 2013. The treaty, even when it becomes effective, would not have an 
enforcement agency. See Colum Lynch, UN Approves Global Arms Treaty, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 2, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-02/world/38208395_1_
legitimate-arms-trade-treaty-humanity-or-war-crimes; Peter Webber, Why the U.S. Isn’t 
Signing the U.N.’s Global Arms Treaty, WEEK (June 3, 2013), http://theweek.com/article/
index/245023/why-the-us-isnt-signing-the-uns-global-arms-treaty.  
103.  See, e.g., HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (A.C. Campbell, 
A.M. trans., Batoche Books 2001) (1625) (translated from the original De Jure Belli ac 
Pacis).  
104.  See id.; see also Anghie, Colonial Origins, supra note 15; Villa, supra note 32.  
105.  See Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, U.S.T.S. 539.  
106.  See General Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument 
of National Policy, Aug. 27 1928, 46 Stat. 234, U.S.T.S. 796 [hereinafter Kellogg–Briand 
Pact].  
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relations. The United States created the foundation for this 
revived vision when it insisted that vanquished leaders in Europe 
and Asia be tried for crimes under international law, including 
waging aggressive war, crimes against humanity, and other 
crimes in their conduct of the war. This novel approach to 
ending international war raised hopes and deepened faith 
among those who envisioned international law as an unbiased 
regulator of the right of states to wage war, jus ad bellum,107 their 
conduct during war, jus in bello,108 and their relationship with 
each other during times of peace. The United States also 
promoted the establishment of international institutions like the 
United Nations to support the international commitment to 
build a regime of peace dictated by law.109 The Preamble of the 
United Nations Charter expressed the determination of “WE THE 
PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS . . . to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war.”110 The Charter executed 
this determination by making international peace a prime 
obligation of the institution and its members.111 The Charter 
specifically required nations to “settle their international 
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international 
peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.”112 
Members were also required to “refrain in their international 
relations from threat or use of force against the territorial 
                                                                                                                            
107.  Earlier efforts to achieve legally binding limitations on the rights of nations 
to wage wars can be tracked back to at least Grotius’ De Jure Belli ac Pacis, supra note 103, 
and includes the 1928 Pact of Paris (The Kellogg-Briand Pact), supra note 106.  
108.  At the forefront of efforts to regulate conduct during warfare, the 
foundation of humanitarian law, were the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, supra note 105, and the Geneva Conventions, 
Convention for the Protection of War Victims Concerning Amelioration of the 
Conditions of Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the Protection of War Victims Concerning 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed 
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention for the 
Protection of War Victims Concerning Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention for the Protection of War Victims 
Concerning Protection of Civilians in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287. The Nuremberg Principles and judgment enriched this area of 
international law.  
109.  See U.N. Charter pmbl.  
110.  Id.  
111.  See, e.g., U.N. Charter pmbl., arts. 1, 2, 4–6, 11, 12.  
112.  Id. art. 2, para. 3.  
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integrity or political independence of any state.”113 In addition, 
the UN Security Council was created as a principal organ of the 
UN and granted broad powers to supervise this renewed 
international commitment to contain destructive international 
conflicts and limit the right of states to use force in international 
affairs.114 It is instructive that the real power to enforce peace 
was thus entrusted to the Security Council, an overtly political 
organ as opposed to the ICJ. A strong and expanding secretariat 
headed by the UN Secretary-General was also developed to 
implement these aims. Other global institutions and 
prescriptions in the areas of human rights and economic 
development were developed to support this architecture of 
peace and conflict regulation. Furthermore, regional 
institutions and prescriptions were fostered to complement and 
supplement their global counterparts. 
However, the post war initiatives to deepen the role of law 
in international peace and security have not produced 
impressive results. About 250 major wars have taken place since 
1945, with over 50 million people killed as a result, and millions 
more otherwise affected.115 Arguably, it could have been much 
worse. For a relatively brief period of time, the Cold War actually 
constrained the nature and scope of destructive conflicts as it 
focused our passion on the possibilities of global conflagration. 
The overwhelming potential of each camp to destroy humanity 
provided an effective even if temporary disciplining mechanism 
for violent international conflicts. Fear of nuclear annihilation 
became the guardian of an ephemeral and morally ambiguous 
peace. 
The end of the Cold War did not yield a peace dividend or 
a structurally different approach to international security. 
Instead, it unleashed broader and more complicated destructive 
forces across a wide swath of the earth, sparing no continent or 
region. The international peace regime centered at the United 
                                                                                                                            
113.  Id. art. 2, para. 4.  
114.  See id. art. 24 (“In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United 
Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree in carrying out its duties 
under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.”).  
115.  See War and Peace, PEACE PLEDGE UNION, http://www.ppu.org.uk/learn/
infodocs/st_war_peace.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).  
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Nations, with its exaggerated focus on legal rules, has not been 
able to respond in any creditable manner. One could search in 
vain for either coherence or competence in its responses. The 
Rwandan genocide, the crimes against humanity that marked 
the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, and the protracted 
destruction of Somali civil society and governmental authority, 
were only some of the earliest tests that the system failed. Some 
of the wars like those in Sudan or the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (“DRC”) have gone on for so long, they have become 
effectively normalized aspects of our global system.116 Millions 
have died even as the international bureaucracy and its rhetoric 
of peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace building, humanitarian 
intervention, responsibility to protect, and such, have grown in 
size, volume, and self-importance. In order to accept 
international law’s relevance to diverse decisions, desires and 
impulses that result in humanity’s unyielding cavalcade of 
savagery, one has to reject the history and pattern of violence, 
suspend our capacity for reason or emotion, and treat each 
episode of contemporary transnational mass murder brought 
persistently to our consciousness everyday by modern 
technology, as if a flaw.   
1. Containing War Among Nations: the 2003 Invasion of Iraq 
 
Not perhaps that primitive men were more faithless than 
their descendants of today, but that they went straighter to 
their aim, and were more artless in their recognition of 
success as the only standard of morality.117 
 
Our nation enters this conflict reluctantly, yet our purpose 
is sure. The people of the United States and our friends and 
allies will not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that 
                                                                                                                            
116.  See Jeffrey Gettleman, Africa’s Dirty Wars, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 8, 2012, at 
33 (reviewing WILLIAM RENO, WARFARE IN INDEPENDENT AFRICA (2011)); Alex de Waal, 
The Wars of Sudan, NATION, Mar. 1, 2007, http://www.thenation.com/article/wars-
sudan#; Randolph Martin, Sudan’s Perfect War, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2002, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/57818/randolph-martin/sudans-perfect-war; 
Simon Robinson & Vivienne Walt, The Deadliest War in the World, TIME, May 28, 2006,  
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1198921,00.html.  
117.  JOSEPH CONRAD, NOSTROMO 234 (Dover 2002).  
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threatens the peace with weapons of mass murder . . . . 
Now that conflict has come, the only way to limit its 
duration is to apply decisive force and I assure you this will 
not be a campaign of half measures and we will accept no 
outcome but victory. My fellow citizens, the dangers to our 
country and the world will be overcome . . . .118 
 
The 2003 Iraq War stands as the most striking 
demonstration of the incoherence and functional incompetence 
of the international law peace enforcement regime. Most 
observers today agree that the US-led invasion of Iraq was a gross 
violation of the international prohibition against using war to 
resolve international disputes absent lawful self-defense 
justification or approval of the UN Security Council. Kofi 
Annan, the UN Secretary-General at the time of the invasion, 
has admitted that the 2003 invasion of Iraq was illegal under 
international law.119 Yet, the position of officials of the invading 
countries remains steadfastly that the invasion was legal. Former 
Secretary of State Colin Powell insisted that the invasion “was 
totally consistent with international law.”120 And it is difficult to 
disagree with Secretary Powell. International law in general 
embraces this sort of self-validation of right and wrong through 
the successful exercise of power. The post Second World War 
peace regime of international law did not change this reality. It 
is an inescapable fact, even if banal, that subsequent 
international criminal law was built upon the prosecution of the 
vanquished of that conflict. As US Chief Justice Stone observed 
then, “[s]o far as the Nuremberg trial is an attempt to justify the 
application of the power of the victor to the vanquished because 
the vanquished made aggressive war, . . . I dislike extremely to 
see it dressed up with the false facade of legality. The best that 
can be said for it is that it is a political act of the victorious States 
                                                                                                                            
118.  President Bush, Address on the Start of the War in Iraq, supra note 72.  
119.  Tammy Kupperman, Powell Says U.S.-Led War on Iraq ‘Consistent with 
International Law’, NBC NEWS (Sept. 17, 2004, 11:34 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/
id/6016893/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/powell-says-us-led-war-iraq-consistent-
international-law/#.UltNo2R4ZDE (“Asked whether the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq broke 
international law, Annan said, ‘yes, if you wish. I have indicated it was not in conformity 
with the UN Charter from our point of view, and from the charter point of view it was 
illegal.’”). 
120.  Id.  
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which may be morally right.”121 Who prosecutes the victors? Or, 
as another observer puts it, “for the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
courts, it mattered little to the validity of criminal proceedings 
against Axis leadership that Allied victors had committed vast 
war crimes of their own.”122 
The peace regime of the UN Charter is fully flexible in its 
interpretive possibilities and quite capable of these sorts of 
manipulation by the victors. The peace and security 
maintenance provisions of the UN Charter cannot claim 
coherence or determinacy. They are always contested and 
especially subject to the capacity of the powerful. Indeed, that is 
why five of the most powerful members of the United Nations 
insisted and were granted veto powers over substantive decisions 
of the UN Security Council.123 It is unsurprising that these 
members also possess the largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons. 
Faith in international law holds only so much promise even for 
the most powerful. 
Reflecting on the ten-year anniversary of the Iraq War, 
Hans Blix, former head of UN weapons inspection in Iraq, 
called the war “a terrible mistake and violation of UN 
Charter.”124 Surveys also show that a majority of the American 
people share that view.125 However, the Iraq war was more than a 
tragic mistake, made by a small group of misguided national 
leaders. It marked an enormous rejection of one of the core 
claims of modern international law as the foundation of world 
peace and highlighted the inherent incoherence of 
international law pertaining to the use of force. The disciplining 
of sovereign right to declare war, jus ad bellum, was supposed to 
be one of the prime accomplishments of the regime constructed 
                                                                                                                            
121.  See HENRY STEINER ET AL., supra note 5, at 127 (quoting ALPHEUS 
THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW (1956)).  
122.  See MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW 
122 (1997).  
123.  U.N. Charter art. 27 (requiring the concurring votes of the permanent 
members on non-procedural matters); Id. art. 23 (giving permanent membership to 
five nations: Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States). 
124.  See Hans Blix, Hans Blix: Iraq War Was a Terrible Mistake and Violation of U.N. 
Charter, CNN (Mar. 19, 2013, 4:36 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/18/opinion/
iraq-war-hans-blix/index.html?iref=allsearch. 
125.  See Andrew Dugan, On 10th Anniversary, 53% in U.S. See Iraq War as Mistake, 
GALLUP POLITICS (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/161399/10th-
anniversary-iraq-war-mistake.aspx.   
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after the Second World War. The discipline clearly failed in the 
case of Iraq as it has in other conflicts because it was built on a 
flimsy foundation composed of conflicting interests and hopes. 
The rhetoric of thinly disguised Pax Americana contained in the 
UN Charter prescriptions on the use of force suggested faith 
that the world at that time had experienced a sort of end of 
history moment. Once it became apparent as more dominated 
peoples became free and began to define their interests and that 
many others preferred change to stability, the promises of peace 
built on law became subordinate to very narrow appreciation of 
national interest. As it turned out, there were enough gaps in 
the plain statement of the form and substance of the 
international law of peace to allow for the illusion of 
compliance. As one group of defenders of the invasion argued, 
“[i]n the end, each use of force must find legitimacy in the facts 
and circumstances that the state believes have made it 
necessary.”126 Well put. The international law of peace, the 
prohibition against waging aggressive war, and the requirement 
of self-defense or authorization of the UN Security Council, are 
reduced to the belief of the aggressor state under the 
circumstances. Needless to say, not every state would have the 
capacity to act on their belief or deal with the consequences of 
such action. Thus, even though it could not get support from 
the Security Council to invade Iraq and faced widespread 
opposition around the world, the United States and a few allies 
proceeded employing a variety of dubious law-sounding 
rationales to justify its actions and maintain legal fiction. 
Thomas Franck, writing shortly after the invasion, 
bemoaned the death of UN Charter restraints on the use of 
force.127 He lamented: 
[W]hile a few government lawyers still go through the 
motions of asserting that the invasion of Iraq was justified by 
                                                                                                                            
126.  William H. Taft & Todd F. Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq, and International Law, 
97 AM. J. INT’L. L. 557, 557 (2003). Mr. Taft was the legal adviser to the U.S. State 
Department at the time of the invasion.  
127.  See Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq, 97 
AM. J. INT’L. L. 607 (2003) [hereinafter Franck, What Happens Now?] (raising similar 
questions about the efficacy of the UN Charter use of force regime as in another article 
written decades earlier); see Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing 
Norms Governing the Use of Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT’L. L. 809 (1970) [hereinafter 
Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?].  
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our inherent right of self-defense, or represented a 
collective measure authorized by the Security Council under 
Chapter VII of the Charter, the leaders of America no 
longer bother with such legal niceties. Instead, they boldly 
proclaim a new policy that openly repudiates the obligation. 
Article 2(4). What is remarkable, this time around, is that 
once obligatory efforts by the aggressor to make a serious 
effort to stretch the law to legitimate state action have given 
way to a drive to repeal the law altogether, replacing it with 
a principle derived from the Athenians at Melos: “the strong 
do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”128 
The Bush administration’s successful bulldozing of 
international laws’ constraints on international war making 
confirmed the hollowness and transient nature of these 
commitments. It is simply not credible to believe that there is 
much more to these pledges of peaceful behavior than a 
nation’s assessment of its might or likelihood of success in 
decisions to wage war. We also see such calculations in play as 
nations join the feast of murder and mayhem in Syria, and as 
they march toward violent confrontation over Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions. The triumph of this vision of international law was 
captured in a recent New York Times headline for an opinion 
piece dealing with the Syrian civil war: “Bomb Syria, Even if It Is 
Illegal.”129 
As for Iraq, the rest of the international community quickly 
confirmed the incoherence and functional incompetence of the 
international legal regime with regard to the invasion of Iraq. 
Barely six weeks after the UN Security Council had refused to 
endorse the invasion that many including the UN Secretary-
General had called illegal, the Security Council voted without 
opposition to endorse the occupation and administration of 
Iraq by the victorious invaders.130 The vote was justified as 
“simply a recognition of the facts on the ground.”131 Those 
nations who could, moved on to protecting as much of their 
national commercial interests in Iraq as they could in light of 
                                                                                                                            
128.  Franck, What Happens Now?, supra note 127, at 608.   
129.  Ian Hurd, Bomb Syria, Even If It Is Illegal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2013, http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2013/08/28/opinion/bomb-syria-even-if-it-is-illegal.html?_ r=0.  
130.  See Tony Karon, Behind The UN Vote on Iraq, TIME, May 22, 2003, 
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,454203,00.html.  
131.  Id.  
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the new realities created by victory, even if temporary and 
ultimately illusory. The result confirmed up to a point an earlier 
conclusion by Professor Franck that “[n]ational self-interest, 
particularly the national self-interest of the super-Powers, has 
usually won out over treaty obligations . . . It is as if 
international law, always something of a cultural myth, has been 
demythologized.”132 This conclusion must now incorporate the 
fact the United States is now the sole surviving super-power and, 
at least in the case of Iraq, acted as if that is the way it will always 
be. 
The incoherence and functional incompetence of the 
international peace regime were further illustrated just a few 
years later. Many of those countries that were outraged at the 
Bush administration’s almost singular determination of what 
constitutes authorization under international law to go to war in 
Iraq, eagerly sought the war-making capacities of the United 
States in new conflicts against other “rogues” in the Middle East: 
First, it was to liberate Libyans from Muammar Gaddafi.133 Then, 
it was Syrians from Bashar al-Assad.134 Some neo-conservatives in 
the United States had once ridiculed the United Nations as “the 
tooth fairy of American politics: Few adults believe in it, but it’s 
generally regarded as a harmless story to amuse the children. 
Since 9/11, however, the UN has ceased to be harmless . . . 
The United Nations has emerged at best as irrelevant to the 
terrorist threat that concerns us, and at worst as an obstacle to 
our winning the war on terrorism.”135 The ease with which the 
                                                                                                                            
132.  Franck, Who Killed Article 2 (4)?, supra note 127, at, 836.  
133.  See Ross Douthat, Libya’s Unintended Consequences, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/08/opinion/sunday/libyas-unintended-
consequences.html?_r=0.; Seumas Milne, If the Libyan War Was About Saving Lives, It Was 
a Catastrophic Failure, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 26, 2011, http:// 
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/oct/26/libya-war-saving-lives-catastrophic-
failure; James Risen et al., Militant Forces Got Arms Meant for Libya Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
6, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/06/world/africa/weapons-sent-to-libyan-
rebels-with-us-approval-fell-into-islamist-hands.html?pagewanted=all.  
134.  See Mark Mazzetti et al., No Quick Impact in U.S. Arms Plan for Syria Rebels, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 15, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/15/world/middleeast/no-
quick-impact-in-us-arms-plan-for-syria-rebels.html?pagewanted=all; Syrian Rebel Fighters’ 
Civil War Within a Civil War, BBC NEWS (July 12, 2013, 9:34 AM),  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23285869. 
135.  See David Frum & Richard Perle, UN Should Change—Or U.S. Should Quit,, 
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2004, http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jan/23/opinion/oe-
frum23.  
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United States was able to remove international legal obstacles to 
its unilateral decision to employ force in Iraq should encourage 
a more benign evaluation from these fervent advocates of 
unipolarism.136 
2. Containing Civil Wars: Syria 
 
But make no mistake: President Obama believes there must 
be accountability for those who would use the world’s most 
heinous weapons against the world’s most vulnerable 
people. Nothing today is more serious, and nothing is 
receiving more serious scrutiny.137 
 
With regard to Syria where an apparently authentic civil war 
has now attracted a diverse group of international backers, there 
is little pretense that The UN Charter-based post Second World 
War regime of peace and security is operational.138 With a 
conservative estimate of over 100,000 people dead,139 at this 
point, a revolt against a dictatorship has morphed into a 
                                                                                                                            
136.  See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, FOREIGN AFF. (AM. & 
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137.  John Kerry, U.S. Secretary of State, Statement on Chemical Weapons in 
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138.  See Steven A. Cook, After the Arab Spring, ATLANTIC, Mar. 28, 2011, 
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Support Among Syrians, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/
09/world/middleeast/in-syria-missteps-by-rebels-erode-their-support.html?
pagewanted=all.  
139.  Estimate is as of late July 2013. See Albert Aji & Edith M. Lederer, U.N.: More 
than 100,000 Now Dead in Syria’s Civil War, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 25, 2013, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/07/25/100000-dead-in-syrias-civil-
war/2587521/.  
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sectarian conflict with diverse international sponsors. It is 
difficult to see that the conflict will dissipate when the current 
regime is ousted.140 After years of partisan involvement, the 
international community’s best ideas now revolve around 
arming one side or the other or coming up with a legal pretext 
to intervene directly.141 At the 2012 UN summit, UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki Moon called the Syrian civil war a “serious and 
growing threat to international peace and security” and urged a 
stop to “the violence and flows of arms to both sides.”142 At the 
same gathering, President Obama expressed a different 
conclusion. He pledged support for the Syrians trying to oust 
Assad even as Russia, China, and others remained firmly in 
Assad’s camp.143 
Today, the United States and other western countries have 
considerable support, even in the Arab world, to arm the Syrian 
rebels with deadly weapons or to take additional actions against 
the Assad regime.144 Evidence that the Syrian government forces 
have employed chemical weapons has provided additional 
reasons for international opponents of the regime to express 
outrage and press for military intervention.145 The Syrian 
                                                                                                                            
140.  Id.  
141.  See Arab League Draft Resolution Declares ‘Right’ to Arm Syrian Rebels, RADIO 
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144.  See Arab League Draft Resolution Declares ‘Right’ to Arm Syrian Rebels, supra note 
141.  
145.  Rick Gladstone et al., UK to Bring Resolution to Security Council, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Aug. 29, 2013, http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2013/08/29/syria-
asserts-claim-new-strikes-impasse-looms/pZicPVjG6hm3D8mfJzuNBM/story.html. The 
Syrian government has apparently caved in to the threat of force by the United States 
by agreeing to join the Chemical Weapons Convention and to allow internationally 
supervised destruction of it chemical weapons. See Patrick J. McDonell, Syria Meets 
Chemical Weapons Deadline, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2013, www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-
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government has its own group of similarly committed backers.146 
Few objective observers can discern the virtues of one side over 
the other when it comes to justifying the deployment of 
additional deadly weapons in an already horrifying 
environment. 
It is a testament to modern international law’s incoherence 
that all sides could easily claim to be on the side of peace while 
killing each other with such alacrity. The UN Charter curiously 
did not explicitly extend its use of force restraints, flawed as they 
have been in practice, to internal or domestic conflicts. This is 
surprising because one of the prime lessons derived from the 
Second World War was that how a nation treats its citizens could 
have important consequences for the rest of the world.147 This 
recognition is behind the Charter’s linking of human rights 
promotion to international peace and security. Article 24 
“confer[s] on the Security Council primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.”148 Yet, the 
Charter’s peace regime, including Security Council authority to 
maintain international peace and security, focused on reducing 
conflicts among nations ignoring the empirical facts that huge 
numbers of people perish or suffer in internal conflicts and that 
such conflicts rarely fail to attract outside intervention or 
develop external consequences.149 The formal powers and 
procedures available to the Security Council to promote 
peaceful settlement of disputes,150 and to deal with threats to 
peace,151 are built upon this nexus of interstate conflicts. 
Moreover, Article 2 (4) prohibited “the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state.”152 While UN practice has evolved over time to stretch 
understanding of what constitutes threats to international peace 
                                                                                                                            
146.  See Karen De Young & Joby Warrick, Russia Sends Arms to Syria As It Tries to 
Reassert Its Role in Region, WASH. POST, May 29, 2013, 
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150.  See id. ch. VI.  
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and security, the legal regime fosters incoherence and 
incompetence. In practice, there are no discernible standards 
for UN involvement except the level of atrocity. Disputes and 
travesties are allowed to foster within countries for too long as 
the world waits, in effect, to see if the state can crush challenges 
to its power monopoly. The vacuum has encouraged a sort of 
free-for-all as other states get to determine, based on their own 
interests, whether and when a particular violent conflict in 
another state should be understood in international terms.153 
Thus, we find in Syria, that a popular revolt is fostered 
supposedly in the name of freedom and democracy against a 
dictatorship by other repressive regimes like Saudi Arabia, 
Jordan, and Qatar. The latter states then get support from 
Western nations in the name of freedom and democracy. 
Meanwhile, at the United Nations, there is no consensus, 
agreement or decision, so coalitions of the willing form to act as 
they see their interests.154 It would thus be a tragic error to see 
what has developed in Syria as a successful deployment of 
international law. That Syria has agreed to respect the Chemical 
Weapons Convention and to give up its chemical weapons 
stockpile under the threat of force by a bigger power merely 
reaffirms the triumph of force over law and the resilience of the 
status quo. The Assad regime remains in place. The violence 
continues.155  It is the same old miserable world. 
                                                                                                                            
153.  For instance, even though the United States had already called for the 
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155.  See Ezra Klein, Why Do We Even Care About Syria’s Chemical Weapons?, 
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However, the global arms trade will not suffer.156 It has the 
international law of peace and human rights on its side. Post 
Second World War international law has not found a formula 
for maintaining international peace and security despite its 
pretentions. Its doctrines lack coherence and its institutions are 
bereft of competence. 
D. Promoting Decency: Ameliorating Misery and Structured Poverty 
 
International law, which has excelled in the punctilious 
insistence on the respect owed by one sovereign State to 
another, henceforth acknowledges the sovereignty of man. 
For fundamental human rights are rights superior to the law 
of the sovereign state.157 
 
This section examines the relationship between the 
ascendance of human rights discourse and activism on the one 
hand, and global misery and structured poverty on the other, to 
support these criticisms. Until recently, various sources placed 
the number of people who are poor at about forty-seven percent 
of the world’s population, with roughly half of that number 
classified as abjectly poor.158 The World Bank and the United 
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JONES (May 30, 2013, 2:28 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/05/
global-arms-trade-new-cold-war.  
157.  See  H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 61 (1950).  
158.  See Poverty Overview, WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPA/0,,contentMDK:20040961~menuPK:
435040~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:430367~isCURL:Y,00.html (last visited 
Oct. 14, 2013); see generally Human Development Reports: 1990–2011, HUM. DEV. RS, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2013); WORLD BANK, WORLD 
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Nations Development Program (“UNDP”) have long employed 
a formula that characterized poverty as subsistence on less than 
US$2.00 (sometimes US$2.50 is used) a day.159 Those living on 
less than one dollar (or US$1.25) are considered abjectly or 
extremely poor.160 The Word Bank recently calculated that there 
are about 1.22 billion people in the world living below the 
extreme poverty line even after, it claims, hundreds of millions 
have been lifted off the extreme poverty roll in the last three 
decades.161 Another 2.4 billion people are still considered to be 
just poor, calculated to be living on less than US$2.00 a day.162 
According to the UNDP, “the proportion of people living on 
less than $1.25 a day fell from 47 per cent in 1990 to 24 per cent 
in 2008—a reduction from over 2 billion to less than 1.4 
billion.”163 However, the percentage of poor in South Asia and 
Africa still averages about seventy percent of the populations.164 
Those who are extremely poor constitute on the average about 
thirty-one percent of the population in South Asia and nearly 
fifty percent in Sub-Saharan Africa.165 
The single most important factor in the privileged position 
of international law after the Second World War has been the 
explicit assertion that the discipline offered the optimal path 
toward achieving both international peace and security, and 
individual freedom and security. US President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt had opened the way in his famous “Four Freedoms” 
address in January 1941.166 Roosevelt’s justifications for 
American involvement in the war on the side of Great Britain 
extended his domestic social justice vision to a world in 
                                                                                                                            
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010: DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE 392 (2010), available 
at http://wdronline.worldbank.org//worldbank/bookpdfdownload/33.  
159.  See, e.g., Poverty Overview, supra note 158.  
160.  Id.  
161.  Id.  
162.  Id.  
163.  See UNITED NATIONS, THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT 2012, 
at 4 (2012) available at http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/MDG%20
Report%202012.pdf.  
164.  See Poverty, WORLD BANK, data.worldbank.org/topic/poverty (last visited 
Sept. 17 2013).  
165.  Id.  
166.  See Franklin D. Roosevelt, President, Annual Message (Four Freedoms) to 
Congress (Jan. 6, 1941), available at http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=
true&doc=70&page=transcript).  
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turmoil.167 He offered ordinary people a reason the fight and die 
beyond the traditional national or imperial imperatives.168  
Post war international efforts to codify this successful 
mobilization strategy began with the UN Charter.169 People no 
longer have to fight just for abstract ideas of statehood or 
national identity; they now have a personal stake in the fight. 
The Four Freedoms—freedom of speech, freedom of worship, 
freedom from want, and freedom from fear—now became part 
of the structure and purpose of a new international order.170 
The UN Charter extended this stake to all humanity when it tied 
the reaffirmation of “faith in fundamental human rights, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of 
men and women and of nations large and small,” to the 
commitment “to save succeeding generations from the scourge 
of war.”171 Furthermore, the UN Charter highlighted the 
promotion of human rights as a key purpose of the renewed 
international scheme.172 The UDHR173 and the Twin 
Covenants174, elaborating an assortment of rights ranging from 
civil and political, to economic, social, and cultural, added to 
what has become today an impressively comprehensive, almost 
hegemonic scheme of rights identification, definition, and 
implementation.175 Despite early efforts to privilege one category 
                                                                                                                            
167.  Id. at 8 (“We look forward to a world founded upon four essential human 
freedoms. The first is freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world. 
The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way— everywhere in 
the world. The third is freedom from want . . . everywhere in the world. The fourth is 
freedom from fear . . . anywhere in the world.”).   
168.  See generally id.  
169.  See U.N. Charter art. 1.  
170.  See id.  
171.  See id. pmbl.  
172.  See id. art. 1, para. 3.  
173.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(“UDHR”), together with the twin covenants—the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)—are considered the International Bill of Rights. 
174.  See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 14668, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Dec 16, 1966); see International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, G.A. Res 14531, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (Dec. 16, 1966).  
175.  See Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, What are Human Rights?, 
U.N. HUM. RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/WhatareHuman
Rights.aspx (last visited Sept. 17, 2013) (“Universal human rights are often expressed 
and guaranteed by law, in the forms of treaties, customary international law, general 
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of rights over others, the human rights community insists that 
rights as such are indivisible, equal, and interdependent.176 Yet 
economic and social rights in discourse and practice have 
struggled to obtain the degree of respect and fulfillment 
accorded to civil and political rights. 
Critical analyses of rights discourse and activism have 
highlighted the same types of deficiencies raised about the 
broader field of international law. Charges of doctrinal 
incoherence and functional incompetence are amply supported 
by examples within all categories of the human rights corpus.177 
However, while the deficiencies of international law might 
appear more dramatic when issues of annihilation or wars are 
discussed, they are just as critical when structured poverty and 
endemic misery are considered. 
1. Misery, Law, and the Millennium Development Goals 
 
Developing countries are on track to meet, ahead of time, 
the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goal to 
reduce by half the world’s extreme poverty rate by 2015. 
Over the past few decades, hundreds of millions of people 
have benefited from a greater access to education and 
better-paying jobs – two of the most important tickets to a 
better life. Yet, nearly 1.3 billion people remain below the 
extreme poverty line with an income of US $1.25 or less a 
day. Another 2.6 billion live on less than US $2 a day, 
another common measurement of deep deprivation.178 
 
                                                                                                                            
principles and other sources of international law. International human rights law lays 
down obligations of Governments to act in certain ways or to refrain from certain acts, 
in order to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
individuals or groups.”).  
176.  See id. As the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights puts 
it: “Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, whatever our nationality, 
place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, language, or any 
other status. We are all equally entitled to our human rights without discrimination. 
These rights are all interrelated, interdependent and indivisible.” Id.  
177.  See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 18; Hillary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, 
The Gender of Jus Cogens, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 63 (1993); Makau Mutua, The Ideology of 
Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 589 (1996).  
178.  United Nations Millennium Campaign, FACEBOOK (Feb. 8 2013, 6:29 AM) 
https://www.facebook.com/mcampaign/posts/602694636423410.  
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The world is replete with misery made an acceptable part of 
the human experience despite routine pronouncements, plans, 
conferences, agendas, agreements and assorted schemes to 
combat it. Most today would not argue that for a large number 
of human beings, survival is an everyday imperative in their 
short time on this earth. The most crass among us might argue 
that things are much better today than in the past. And global 
efforts today often revolve around how clear the path to 
reducing global misery would be if we could only do this small 
thing, adopt this plan, or impose this tax, or plan for another 
grand initiative sprinkled liberally with the language of law. 
When it comes to ameliorating misery on a global scale, 
international law and systems have supported two basic 
approaches: charity, and commerce. The former approach is 
riddled with the corruption, paternalism, and infantilism 
generated by bilateral aid agreements, security assistance, and 
international non-governmental organizational intervention. 
Adherents of the latter approach have perfected international 
law, international institutions, and legal process as instruments 
to maintain inherited advantages and global inequality. For 
example, the WTO presides over a global trade hegemony that 
ignores billions of dollars in subsidies developed nations provide 
to their domestic agricultural industries in violation of 
international trade law and to the severe detriment of the 
capacities of many of the least developed countries to export 
their produce.179 Meanwhile, the World Bank and the IMF insist 
on standards of economic conduct by developing nations that 
are not generally applied against more developed nations.180 
                                                                                                                            
179.  According to the World Bank: 
Agriculture is often the economic driving force in developing countries. 
WTO statistics show that agriculture accounts for over one-third of export 
earnings for almost 50 developing countries, and for about 40 of them this 
sector accounts for over half of export earnings. However, significant 
agricultural subsidies provided by OECD country governments to their 
farmers compromises the ability of developing country farmers to participate 
in global agricultural trade reducing their income and profit streams and 
their ability to escape poverty. 
Agricultural Trade, WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/O6R2M27TN0.  
180.  See generally JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
(2002). 
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After decades of fighting over national and international 
legal obligations to help the world’s poorest escape poverty and 
to assist the less developed states improve their lot, discourses on 
the right to development have been replaced by faith in the 
market.181 International law has conceded its inconsequence. In 
September 2000, world leaders gathered in New York to 
announce, with great press coverage, the latest international 
agenda to fight misery and other indicia of structured poverty in 
the world—The MDGs.182 The official story was that leaders of 
189 countries came together and promised to “free people from 
extreme poverty and multiple deprivations.”183 The promise was 
structured in the form of eight non-binding Millennium goals to 
be achieved by 2015. Goal One, the commitment to halve the 
proportion of the world’s poorest by 2015 has received the most 
attention.184 World leaders and international bureaucrats insist 
that there is definite connection between the MDGs and human 
rights, and there are of course rear guard action being waged by 
die-hard international law activists and scholars to make the 
same point.185 Yet, the adoption of the MDGs represented the 
exhaustion of the movement to give the global struggle against 
misery and structured poverty an international legal foundation. 
Neo-liberalism won at least with respect to those states that 
cannot fight back with other resources. The right to 
development movement was crushed long ago and proponents 
                                                                                                                            
181.  See, e.g., Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/28, U.N. 
Doc. A/41/28 (1986); see also Bedjaoui, supra note 16, at 178–83; Mohammed Bedjaoui, 
The Right to Development, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 1177 
(Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991); U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working 
Group on the Right to Development on its Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/47 
(2007).  
182.  See United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc 
A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000). The Millennium Development Goals were: (1) Eradicate 
extreme poverty and hunger; (2) Achieve universal primary education; (3) Promote 
gender equality and empower women; (4) Reduce child mortality; (5) Improve 
maternal health; (6) Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; (7) Ensure 
environmental sustainability; and (8) Develop a global partnership for development. 
See The Millennium Development Goals: Eight Goals for 2015, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/mdgoverview/ (last visited Oct. 14, 
2013).  
183.  The Millennium Development Goals, supra note 182.  
184.  Id.  
185.  See Human Rights Are the Basis for Achieving the MDGs, U.N. HUM. RTS., 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/MDG/Pages/FoundationforEngagement.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2013).  
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of economic and social rights have been well confined to 
academia and assorted bands of non-governmental 
organizations.186 The earnest but often insufficiently critical 
study in Western legal academies, of limited judicial opinions 
such as Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corp.,187 Soobramoney v 
Minister of Health (Kwa-Zulu Natal),188 and Government of South 
Africa v. Grootboom,189 from Third World legal outposts, sustains 
hope that is the one true thing international law retains today.190 
The turn to MDGs replaced whatever that was left of the 
international commitment to human rights in the social and 
economic sphere with deeply political methods and goals, 
disentangled from any notion of obligation on the part of the 
privileged toward those for whom an escape to mere poverty 
would be a substantial advance. The MDG’s gratuitous promises 
were a raw demonstration of how little the more developed 
countries were willing to concede in the global struggle for 
economic and social benefits. 
The most recent UNDP report, which touts the “Rise of the 
South,” captured the reality that international law has been 
abandoned or at least diminished in the struggle against global 
misery.191 According to the report, there has been a “profound 
shift in global dynamics driven by the fast-rising new powers of 
                                                                                                                            
186.  Though the UN declaration did mention the commitment “to making the 
right to development a reality for everyone and to freeing the entire human race from 
want.” United Nations Millennium Declaration, supra noted 182.  
187.  Olga Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp., (1985) 2 Supp. S.C.R. 51, A.I.R. 1986 
S.C. 180 (India).   
188.  Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) (S. 
Afr.).  
189.  Gov’t of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 
(S. Afr.).  
190.  These cases are sometimes held up as evidence of the progressive 
realization of social rights through litigation and legal decisions in countries like India 
and South Africa, founded in substantial part on internationally guaranteed rights. 
Unfortunately, in practice, the law does not deliver the benefits often ascribed to it. 
Governments plead that they lack sufficient resources and that judicial power is 
generally impotent to contradict them. For a balanced analysis of the judicial record in 
South Africa, see Eric C. Christiansen, Adjudicating Non-Justiciable Rights: Socio-Economic 
Rights and the South African Constitutional Court, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 321 
(2007). 
191.  See U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, THE 2013 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
REPORT—THE RISE OF THE SOUTH: HUMAN PROGRESS IN A DIVERSE WORLD (2013), 
available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2013_EN_complete.pdf. 
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the developing world.”192 Indeed, the report identifies that 
much of the poverty reduction that has taken place in the world, 
allowing the MDG campaign to claim success meeting its 
poverty-reduction, has come from a few nations in the South, 
primarily the Peoples Republic of China, where about 500 
million people have been lifted from poverty.193 Even if one 
accepts fully the triumphalism in the report and discounts the 
likelihood that economic success in these fast rising countries 
might be temporary or was purchased to some substantial 
degree at considerable cost to lower-tier workers in the older 
developed economies, the implications for the place of 
international law in the struggle against global misery are 
profound. Put bluntly, if China, Brazil, India, and others among 
the fast risers could succeed by engaging the current economic 
model, why not the economic stragglers? The perceived success 
or capacity to succeed of these relatively few countries may stand 
as formidable barriers to those who would want to challenge 
current economic orthodoxy on behalf of those unable or 
prevented from competing. 
The BRICS194 and wannabe-BRICS have seemingly validated 
the legitimacy of the current international economic order. The 
international economic rules of this order are stated in the 
abstract. However, in international practice, the rules, rooted in 
neo-liberal ideology, are enforced against those who require the 
most support while those who control substantial economic 
capacity have considerable freedom to experiment with their 
economic policies consistent with their interests.195 
                                                                                                                            
192.  Id. (stated on back cover of report).  
193.  Id.  
194.  BRICS began as BRIC, an acronym coined in 2001 by officials of the 
investment bank, Goldman Sachs, to identify fast-growing countries—Brazil, Russia, 
India, and China. South Africa was recently added to the group, hence BRICS. See 
J.P.P., Why Is South Africa Included in the BRICS?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 29, 2013, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/03/economist-explains-
why-south-africa-brics. It seems that lately the BRICS have been demonstrating the 
exaggerated piety associated with recent converts. They are now planning for their own 
development bank. See Carol Matlack, Can the BRICS Have Their Own World Bank?, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 27, 2013, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/
2013-03-27/can-the-brics-have-their-own-world-bank; Gabriel Elizondo, BRICS Summit: A 
Perspective from Brazil, ALJAZEERA (Mar. 29, 2013, 10:49 PM), 
http://blogs.aljazeera.com/blog/americas/brics-summit-perspective-brazil.  
195.  See generally STIGLITZ, supra note 180.  
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Internationally determined structural adjustment formulae, for 
example, do not apply to the United States or the other major 
economies in the world regardless of their circumstances. The 
United States and a few privileged others can print money and 
deficit fund economic growth even if the rules say otherwise. 
The least among us have to conform and seek charity. Post 
Second World War international human rights law’s potential 
for economic emancipation at this point is severely 
compromised. 
CONCLUSION: BEYOND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
To turn a phrase, law is legitimized politics-a Hydra-headed 
process of social decision, involving persons at all levels and 
from all walks of public and private life who, with authority 
derived both explicitly and implicitly from community 
consensus or expectation, and supported by formal and 
informal sanction, effect those codes or standards of 
everyday conduct by which we plan and go about our 
lives.196 
 
Richard Falk criticized international law and wrote of a 
movement from inter-state law to a law of humanity. He 
conceded that the “law of humanity is mainly in the dreaming 
(or purely aspirational) phase.”197 Perhaps we should ask why 
presume that the movement away from international law is 
toward a law of some kind at all? What motivates the continuing 
search for such certitude? What is behind this quest for 
enduring solutions, in the face of horrendous realities and 
irreconcilable interests? Are not human politics with its myriad 
unfinished issues and conflicts good enough? Or does cloaking 
politics with sprinklings of legal folderol make the 
precariousness of the human condition more tolerable to 
victims, victors, and activists? The Obama administration and 
Secretary Kerry may decry the “moral obscenity” of using 
chemical weapons and insist that the international community 
must respond with force. But the “moral obscenity” of the 
                                                                                                                            
196.  Weston, supra note 21, at 17.  
197.  Falk, World Order, supra note 14, at x.  
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100,000 plus dead in the civil war and the millions more that die 
every year from preventable conflicts, diseases, and hunger, 
stand as an illuminating reminder of the incoherence and 
incompetence of the order they are defending. 
Over a century ago, the writer and great chronicler of 
imperialism and its pretentions, Joseph Conrad, warned about 
“the cruel futility of lives and of deaths thrown away in the vain 
endeavor to attain an enduring solution of the problem.”198 
Anyone who continues to inhabit a world where they must 
depend on international law to feed them, to save them from 
genocidal intent or nuclear holocaust, or to prevent the next 
Syria, Bosnia, or is it Sierra Leone, from happening, has had a 
privileged existence. The inadequacies of the post Second 
World War international law regime in critical areas of human 
existence are not too difficult to discern. Yet the regime of 
international law still finds potency in the hearts and minds of 
many. It is in the idea, the romance, a source of hope and a spur 
to action for many, even as evidence of its incoherence and 
functional incompetence abounds. H.L. Mencken said this 
much about Mr. Kurtz, one of Conrad’s most arresting 
creations: “Kurtz is at once the most abominable of rogues and 
the most fantastic of dreamers. It is impossible to differentiate 
between his vision and his crimes, though all that we look upon 
as order in the universe stands between them.”199 Matched 
against such dialectic, a call for deep re-examination or even 
abandonment of faith coupled with resolute antipathy toward all 
enduring solutions faces a difficult trajectory. But then one must 
keep asking: 
 
What happens to a dream deferred? 
Does it dry up  
like a raisin in the sun?  
Or fester like a sore—  
And then run?  
Does it stink like rotten meat?  
                                                                                                                            
198.  CONRAD, supra note 117, at 221.  
199.  See H.L. MENCKEN, A BOOK OF PREFACES 39–40 (1917).  
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Or crust and sugar over—  
like a syrupy sweet? 
Maybe it just sags  
like a heavy load. 
Or does it explode?200 
 
Perhaps it is the explosion we are seeing around us 
everyday as a long-suffering and fretful world grows tired of 
waiting for law and other such solutions, long touted by experts, 
to free them from the vagaries and horrors of everyday life. 
Ordinary people experience an existence that comes down to 
chance, greed, fear, and all the other emotions and desires that 
have ineluctably driven diverse quotidian human actions. But, 
these are what give us the great changes that had been wished 
for generations before they occur every now and then. Albert 
Camus, in his seminal work, The Plague, reminds us that the 
most revolutionary act one can take in the midst of unrelenting 
tragedy or horror is solidarity.201 Not grand theories, nor great 
speeches, and not even the most detailed of plans.  
There is no light lit by some exaggerated vision of 
international law at the end of the tunnel of constant human 
struggle. There is no certitude to be found in the law, especially 
not one with the pedigree and experience of international law. 
Grotian Moments do not resolve the fundamental absurdities of 
life that unequal power and human desires have generated. 
There are no final victories to be eternally policed by universal 
law in our future. One may do just as well by embracing a life of 
unrelenting struggles against pestilences of all sorts; struggles in 
which individuals, like the protagonists of The Plague, will be 
distinguished primarily by their capacities for empathy and 
grace. 
 
                                                                                                                            
200.  LANGSTON HUGHES, A DREAM DEFERRED (1951).  
201.  CAMUS, supra note 1, at 253–54.  
